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INTRODUCTION

In the past ten years the subject of consumer protection has
become a matter of increasing public concern. Studies have concluded that unscrupulous business tactics seriously affect our
nation's well being by contributing to social unrest in poverty2
areas' and- by causing severe financial distress to consumers.
Moreover, such tactics concern legitimate businessmen as well,
since money taken by the unethical merchant is money taken from
the honest businessman.'
Although federal law regulates many consumer transactions, a
substantial responsibility for protecting the consumer rests with the
states. Traditionally, however, state consumer protection efforts
have been largely limited to protection of the public through the
use of criminal theft statutes 4 and through the licensing of certain
* Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Consumer Protection, Wisconsin
Department of Justice. A.B. 1960, Stanford University; L.L.B. 1963, University of Michigan Law School.
1. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 11
(1970); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 274 (1968).
2. It has been estimated that several billion dollars are taken from the public each year
through consumer fraud - or more than all the auto thefts, burglaries, robberies, embezzlements, larcenies and forgeries combined. MAGNUSSEN AND CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF
THE MARKETPLACE 8 (1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 33 (1967).
3. In a message to Congress on February 24, 1971, urging a national attack on consumer fraud, President Nixon declared:
. . . the honest businessman is damaged by fraud and deceptive practices every bit
as much as the consumer - and perhaps more. He is subjected to the unfair competition of the unscrupulous businessman, and he loses money. He is subjected to the
opprobrium of those who have suffered at the hands of unscrupulous businessmen,
and he loses the goodwill of the public. For it is a fact, however unfortunate, that in
the area of business especially, the many are commonly judged by the actions of the
few.
4. See, for example, WIs. STAT. § 943.20 (1)(d) (1971).
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trades.5 These approaches have proved useful in cases involving

aggravated fraud or misconduct, but they have constituted an unsatisfactory and inflexible tool in combating the diverse types of

deception practiced upon the public today.'
In recent years numerous states have taken steps to modernize
and streamline state regulation and enforcement against fraudulent
and deceptive sales practices. In 1957 the New York Attorney
General's Office established the first active consumer fraud bu-

reau 7 with primary reliance on civil, rather than criminal, sanc-

tions. Since that time more than thirty-five other states have estab-

lished similar programs.' In addition, several uniform or model
state consumer fraud enforcement laws have been proposed.' Although these proposed model laws differ in many respects, they all
contemplate the creation of a statewide consumer fraud bureau
with the authority to: a) investigate alleged fraudulent and decep-

tive business conduct, b) seek injunctive relief against deceptive
selling practices, and c) obtain court ordered restoration of monies
to consumers injured by such practices.
During the past several years Wisconsin has been a focal point
in the effort to protect the public from unfair and deceptive business practices. This effort is reflected in the passage of far-reaching
legislation, the promulgation of significant new administrative regulations and in aggressive law enforcement against consumer
fraud. This article will examine the development and present pos-

ture of this new body of law in Wisconsin.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. Sections 100.18 and 100.20 - Background
Although sections 100.18 and 100.2010 have long been the two
5. Illustrative ofa state licensing framework is the Wisconsin Department of Regulation
and Licensing which houses some eighteen independent examining and licensing boards.
6. For a discussion of the effectiveness of such approaches see Comment, Consumer
Protection in Michigan: Current Methods and Some Proposals For Reform, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 926, 928-933, 957-966 (1970); and Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PENN. L. REV. 395, 419-421, 424-427
(1966).
7. Mindell, The New York Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection - A Review
of Its Consumer Protection Activities, II N.Y.L.F. 603 (1965).
8. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724 (1972).
9. These include: The Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law (1969)
recommended by the Federal Trade Commission; the Model Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law (1970) suggested by the Council of State Governments; and the
UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES

Acr (1971) drafted and approved by the National

Conference of Commissioner's on Uniform State Law.
10. WIS. STAT. §§ 100.18 and 100.20 (1971).
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principal Wisconsin statutes dealing with unfair and deceptive
business practices, they have enjoyed an inactive and somewhat
obscure existence until recent years.

Section 100.1811 was originally enacted in 1913 to prohibit untrue, deceptive or misleading "advertisements."'

2

However, the

statute was expanded in 194511 to cover any "advertisement, announcement, statement or representation" to the public." Other
subsections were added both to proscribe certain specific frauds 5
and to set positive standards for certain trades. Administration and
enforcement of the statute was placed with the Department of
Agriculture. 7 Section 100.20'1 was enacted in 192119 to regulate

unfair trade practices and unfair methods of competition in business. 20 The Department of Agriculture was provided the authority
11.

WIS. STAT. § 100.18(1) (1971) basically provides that:
no person [or] corporation . . . with intent to sell . . . or with intent to induce the
public . . . to enter into any contract. . . relating to the purchase [or] sale. . . of
any real estate, merchandise, .... shall make, publish . . . in a newspaper . . . or
in the form of a. . . notice .
or over any radio or television station, or in any
other way similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, an advertisement. . . or representation of any kind,. . . which contains any assertion. . . which is untrue, deceptive,
misleading. (Emphasis added.)
12. Wis. Laws 1913, ch. 510. As a result, verbal representations were not within the
ambit of the statute. See 14 Wis. Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 367 (1925). The statute was based upon

a model advertising law drafted by

PRINTERS INK MAGAZINE

and subsequently adopted in

most states. Because of the source of such laws, they are today commonly known as
"Printer's Ink Statutes."
13. Wis. Laws 1945, ch. 399.
14. State v. Automatic Merchandisers of America, Inc., Wis. 2d
N.W.2d (Oct. I, 1974) held that one person can constitute "the public" for purposes
of Wis. STAT. § 100.18(1). The word "public" has been construed under comparable statutes to mean that any person who invites the trade of the general populace in a given area,
or who is engaged in his principal business, is dealing with the "public." See Texas State
Board of Medical Examiners v. Koepsel, 159 Tex. 479, 322 S.W.2d 609 (1959); People v.
Powell, 280 Mich. 699, 274 N.W. 372 (1937); State ex rel. Anderson v. Wjtthaus, 340 Mo.
1004, 102 S.W.2d 99 (1937); Ford Hydro-Electric Co. v. Aurora, 206 Wis. 489, 240 N.W.
418 (1932); Cawler v. Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 133 N.W. 157 (1911). In other words,
§ 100.18(1) does not extend to misrepresentations in connection with a casual or incidental
sale of merchandise not related to the business of the seller.
15. For example, bait and switch advertising. Wis. STAT. § 100.18(9) (1971).
16. For example, gasoline retailing. Wis. STAT. § 100.18(6) and (8) (1971).
17. WIS. STAT. § 100.18(7) (1953), which was renumbered § 100.18(1 l)(a) by Wis. Laws
1969, ch. 425.
18. WIs. STAT. § 100.20(1) (1971) reads as follows:
(1) Methods of competition in business and trade practices in business shall be fair.
Unfair methods of competition in business and unfair trade practices in business are
hereby prohibited.
19. Wis. Laws 1921, ch. 571. For a review of the stormy events leading to the enactment
of this law, see Kellogg, Czar in Lambskin? Administrative Regulation of Commercial
Activities in Wisconsin, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 133.
20. "Business" is defined as including "any business, except that of banks, savings and
loan associations, insurance companies and public utilities." WIs. STAT. § 93.01(13) (1971).
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to administratively prohibit unfair business practices by enjoining
individual firms through the issuance of special orders21 and by
promulgating general orders 22 applicable to all firms engaged in
certain proscribed business conduct. The statute was patterned
after section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 191423 and
has, therefore, sometimes been referred to as Wisconsin's "Little
FTC Act."
Despite the far-reaching scope of these laws, they received little
attention for more than forty years. From the outset the Department of Agriculture's priorities and expertise prevented it from
effectively regulating unfair and deceptive business practices outside the areas of agriculture and food. 24 Indeed, the Department
apparently lacked adequate staff to even deal with clearcut trade
practice violations other than to refer them to private agencies or
attorneys or to a district attorney. 5 As a result, the potential of
sections 100.18 and 100.20 in dealing with unfair and deceptive
business practices remained largely untapped and attorneys and
judges," not to mention the general public, 7 were largely unaware
of the existence of the trade regulation laws as well as the Department of Agriculture's role in enforcing them.
With advent of "consumerism" during the 1960's, the Department of Agriculture's enforcement role in consumer protection
matters began to come under attack in two ways. First, attempts
were made to change the Department's name to more accurately
reflect its trade regulation and consumer protection functions.2
Secondly, a number of legislative efforts were made to transfer the
consumer protection enforcement responsibilities of the Depart21. WIs. STAT. § 100.20(3) (1971).
22. WIS. STAT. § 100.20(2) (1971).
23. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
24. Wylie, The Regulation of Trade Practices by Codes, 12 Wis. L. REV. 265, 266
(1936).
25. In Czar in Lambskin?, supra note 19, at 155, the commentator stated that in the
event the Department of Agriculture's complaints revealed illegal activity, it would "inform
the violator of the applicable statute or order, and advise the complainant to see the local
Better Business Bureau, Chamber of Commerce, a lawyer or the district attorney, as the
case may be." See also Wis. LEG. BUREAU REPORT, CONSUMER PROTECTION BY THE STATE
OF WISCONSIN 4 (1968).

26. Id.
27. The public identification of the Department's enforcement role was perhaps most
poignantly expressed by a landlady charged with unfair trade practices as follows: "What
in the world has Agriculture got to do with houses? We don't grow weeds." Milwaukee
Journal, May 21, 1970, § I, at 1, col. 6.
28. The most common suggestions were to change the name to Department of Agriculture and Commerce or Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs. However, all such
attempts to change the department's name have failed.
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ment to the Attorney General.29 While the opponents of transferring the Department's enforcement responsibilities to the Attorney

General argued that such duties should not be placed with an
elected official, the proponents emphasized the need for the involvement of a statewide law enforcement agency to effectively
combat consumer fraud." They also contended that the Depart-

ment of Agriculture's involvement in trade practice enforcement,
though perfectly justified in the early twentienth century, had become antiquated and outmoded in our more urbanized society."
The early legislative efforts to transfer the Department of Agri-

culture's consumer protection enforcement functions to the Attorney General were resisted both by the Department and the business

community." In 1961, Governor Gaylord Nelson, with the sup-33
port of Attorney General John Reynolds, introduced two bills
which would have transferred the Department of Agriculture's authority under section 100.20 to the Attorney General. These bills
failed as did two similar bills introduced in 196311 with the bi29. Earlier, in 1951, the legislature did grant the Attorney General the authority to file
complaints and appear before the Department in its administrative proceedings. Wis. Laws
1951, ch. 622, creating Wis. STAT. § 100.20(4) (1971). However, this administrative remedy
was hardly a major shift of responsibility since the Department of Agriculture retained the
power to hear and dispose of complaints filed under this subsection.
30. Typical of this assessment is the comment in Lovett, supra note 8, at 735:
Although cooperation between an attorney general and an agriculture department
can be reasonably effective, for a number of reasons it is desirable to make the state's
attorney general primarily responsible for enforcement of its deceptive practice statutes. An attorney general normally has more legal expertise and greater access to
hiring able legal staffs, and he would be more likely to implement reasonably vigorous prosecution under the legislation. A state attorney general will normally emphasize his record in consumer protection enforcement as a major factor with the electorate since his main function is law enforcement and few other responsibilities distract
him. In contrast, the typical agriculture department in every state has much more
diverse functions, and its primary emphasis, traditions, and habits of thought are
likely to be the protection of producer interests, such as farmers, farm co-ops, and
food processors, rather than up-to-date representation of urbanized consumer interests. Therefore, a great danger exists that consumer protection enforcement authority placed in a department of agriculture will be much less vigorously and effectively
administered.
To the same effect, see Note, ConsumerProtectionBy the State Attorneys General.A Time
For Renewal, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 410,416-417 (1973); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES 26 (1970).
31. Until recently, Florida was the only other state that had given its Department of
Agriculture primary enforcement authority in consumer fraud matters. In 1973 such authority was removed from that agency and placed with the Attorney General and local state
attorneys. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-124.
32. Czar in Lambskin?. supra note 19, at 136.
33. Wis. S.B. 479 (1961 Sess. and Wis. A.B. 555 (1961 Sess.).
34. Wis. S.B. 596 (1963 Sess.) and Wis. A.B. 725 (1963 Sess.).
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partisan support of Governor Reynolds, a democrat, and Attorney
General George Thompson, a republican. Between 1965 and 1968,
Attorney General Bronson LaFollette introduced two consumer
bills- based upon the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.3 These bills
would have created a comprehensive consumer fraud law and
would have given the Attorney General broad investigative and
injunctive authority. Although these bills fared better than previous efforts 3 they failed nonetheless and tended to create an
38
atmosphere of animosity between the two agencies.
B.

1970 Consumer FraudLegislation

In early 1969, Governor Warren Knowles and newly elected
Attorney General Robert Warren determined that the existing feud
between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Justice concerning consumer protection matters should be ended.
Lengthy negotiations between the agencies resulted in a working

agreement39 which contemplated an integrated complaint processing system, investigation of meritorious complaints by the Depart-

ment of Agriculture and referral of trade practice law violations
to the Department of Justice for commencement of civil proceedings. 0 No understandings were reached at the time with respect to
proposed legislation. 1

It was not long, however, before problems arose under the
cooperative agreement between the two agencies. Not only were
few complaint files developed into actionable cases under the

agreement, but it soon became apparent that the Department of
35. Wis. A.B. 828 (1965 Sess.) and Wis. S.B. 162 (1967 Sess.).
36. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
37. Assembly Bill 828 passed the State Assembly 98-0 and narrowly failed in the State
Senate by a 17-15 vote.
38. Illustrative of the feelings was the statement of Attorney General LaFollette:
As the chief governmental agency in charge of consumer protection, the Department of Agriculture has been largely ineffective. Because it has important responsibilities to the farmers of Wisconsin, the Department has had neither the money nor
the inclination to devote full-time effort to protecting the consumers of our state. In
addition, its demonstrated propensity toward business interest has clearly indicated
that the statutory inclusion of the duty to protect the consumer along with the duty
to regulate and supervise agricultural and industrial activities is no longer justified. . . . Federal Trade Commission, National Consumer Protection Hearings245
(1968).
39. Cooperative consumer protection program agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, June 27, 1969.
40. Id.
41. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Arvid Sather to Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Frederick Griffith, June 20, 1969.
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Justice's authority to handle civil proceedings was makeshift and
inadequate. The principal consumer protection remedy available to
the Attorney General was the public nuisance law,42 which required
the showing of an open, continuous and intentional violation of
public law in order to obtain injunctive relief.4 3 The other available
remedy, revocation of a corporation's authority to do business in
the state," possessed equally serious limitations in that it required
establishing a "substantial and willful violation."4 Moreover, actions could only be brought for violations of existing orders issued
under section 100.2046 and the relief available operated as little
deterrefnt to the continuance of the illegal operation under a new
corporate guise. Thus, it was painfully clear that the statutory
underpinnings of the cooperative agreement prevented its effective
implementation.
Because of these underlying statutory deficiencies, Attorney
General Warren directed that an in-depth survey be conducted of
existing resources, programs and statutes in the consumer fraud
field. This survey resulted in an extensive 240 page report47 which
made the following legislative recommendations:
1. Wisconsin should more fully utilize both the flexible regulatory techniques of the Agriculture Department and the law
enforcement abilities of the Justice Department. ....
.s

2. To achieve this goal, the Department of Justice and the
District Attorneys should be given the authority to obtain tempo-

rary and permanent injunctions in the consumer fraud area ...
In conjunction with this injunctive authority:
a) The common law requirement of proof of actual deception or intent to deceive should be eliminated ...
b) The Department of Justice should be given broad primary investigative authority ...
42. WIs. STAT. § 280.02 (1969).
43. State v. Texaco, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 625, 111 N.W.2d 918 (1961); State ex rel. Abbott
v. House of Vision-Belgard-Spero, Inc., 259 Wis. 87, 47 N.W.2d 321 (1951); State ex rel.
Regez v. Blumer, 236 Wis. 129, 294 N.W. 491 (1940); State ex rel. Cowie v. LaCrosse
Theaters, Inc., 232 Wis. 153, 286 N.W. 707 (1939); State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Theken, 184 Wis. 42, 198 N.W. 729 (1924).
44. Wis. Stat. § 100.24 (1971).

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORT (1969).
48. Thus, the conclusion was not that the Department of Agriculture's consumer protection authority be totally removed as earlier bills had proposed, but that its activities be
tailored to its role as a regulatory rather than an enforcement agency. This recommendation
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c) The Department of Justice should be able to request an

order from the court granting restitution to consumers.

.

.

.49

On October 10, 1969, a bill"0 sponsored by Attorney General
Warren was introduced into the Wisconsin Legislature which contained most of the recommendations of the 240 page report. In
addition to providing the Department of Justice and district attorneys broader authority in enforcing sections 100.18 and 100.20, the
bill granted the Department of Justice investigative powers in consumer protection matters and removed the Department of Agriculture's authority under section 100.18.51 The bill passed the Senate
29 to 152 but became bogged down in the Assembly after it was
referred to the Committee on Agriculture.53 However, following
a public hearing at which the bill received broad support, 4 a compromise bill55 was worked out. Although the compromise measure
actually expanded the Department of Agriculture's authority
under sections 100.18 and 100.2011 it also extended enforcement
57
authority to the Department of Justice and the district attorneys.
was in accord with the conclusion in Comment, Developments in the Law, Deceptive

Advertising, 80

HARV.

L.

REV.

1005, 1134 (1967):

The soundest approach might be to utilize both the flexible regulatory techniques of
an administrative agency and the law enforcement abilities of an attorney general.
An agency invested with rulemaking authority could concentrate on elaborating
illegal practices in specific trades under the deceptive practices law and could apply
these rules to individual cases through assurances of discontinuance or cease-anddesist orders where these means were sufficient. In more extreme cases, the attorney
general could seek more stringent sanctions in the courts, such as injunctions, receivership, or dissolution. Both the agency and the courts could be authorized to order
restitution to known victims of the deceptive practice, thus encouraging the submission of complaints from the public. Jurisdictional conflicts between the agency and
the attorney general would not be unlikely. But assuming that a reasonably tolerable
working relationship developed, a spirit of competition between these two authorities
might well stimulate more creative approaches to commercial regulation.
49. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
REPORT 3-5 (1969).
50. Wis. S.B. 701 (1969 Sess.).
51. Id.
52. WIs. SENATE JOURNAL 2008 (1969 Sess.).
53. Wis. ASSEMBLY JOURNAL 2547 (1969 Sess.).
54. In addition to the Attorney General, the Governor, the District Attorneys' Association and the Wisconsin Consumers' League supported the bill. A representative of the
Federal Trade Commission also strongly endorsed the concept of the bill at the public
hearing. The bill was principally opposed by the Department of Agriculture and the Wisconsin Food Dealer's Association.
55. Wis. Assembly Subst. Amend. I to Wis. S.B. 701 (1969 Sess.).
56. Id. The Agriculture Department was given increased investigative and enforcement
authority under newly created subsections (I l)(c) and (I l)(d) of § 100.18 and newly created
subsection (6) of § 100.20.
57. Wis. STAT. §§ 100.18( l1)(c) and (d) and 100.20(6).
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This version of the bill passed both houses of the legislature in the
closing week of the 1969 session, and was signed into law by Governor Knowles on February 12, 1970.08
Although the new consumer fraud legislation did not substantively change sections 100.18 and 100.20, it did dramatically
strengthen and expand the civil enforcement remedies for violation
of those laws. In general terms, the new legislation provided the
following remedies:
1. Injunction. The Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice and any district attorney, upon informing the Department of Justice, were authorized to commence actions in Circuit Court to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction any
violation of section 100.18.11 Such actions were required to be
commenced within three years after the occurrence of the unlawful
act or practice which was the subject of the action." No injunction
issued could conflict with any general or special orders of the
Department of Agriculture or any federal or Wisconsin statute,
rule or regulation." The Department of Agriculture was also
granted temporary or permanent injunctive authority for violations
of general or special orders issued under section 100.10.62
2. Restitution. As an ancillary remedy to the injunction, the
court could, prior to final judgment, "make such orders and judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person any pecuniary
loss suffered because of the acts or practices involved in the ac63
tion."
3. Voluntary Assurances. The Department of Agriculture and
the Department of Justice were authorized to accept voluntary
assurances of discontinuance of acts or practices alleged to be
violations of section 100.18.64 Violations of such assurances were
to be treated as violations of section 100.18.65
4. Civil Forfeitures For Continued Violations. The Department of Justice and any district attorney were empowered to
commence actions to recover civil forfeitures of not less than $100
nor more than $10,000 for any violation of an injunction issued
58. As Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 425.
59. WIS. STAT. § 100.18 (11)(d) (1971).
60. WIS. STAT. § 100.18 (1 l)(b)(3) (1971).
61. Id.
62. Vis. STAT. § 100.20(6) (1971).
63. Wis. STAT. § 100.18(11)(d)(1971). Substantially identical authority was also provided under Wis. STAT. § 100.20(6) (1971).
64. Wis. STAT. § 100.18(11)(e) (1971).
65. Id.
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under section 100.18 or a general or special order issued under
section 100.20.6 The civil forfeiture remedy supplemented the previously existing criminal remedies67 by providing stiff monetary
penalties without the stigma or the burden of proof of a criminal
proceeding.
5. Investigatory Authority. The new law gave the Department

of Agriculture vastly expanded preliminary investigative powers in
consumer protection matters whenever it had "reason to believe"
that any person possessed information or documentary material
relevant to the enforcement of section 100.18.11 Additional investi-

gative authority was also provided for violations of orders issued
under section 100.20.69 Although the Department of Justice was
given limited investigative authority" it could request the Depart71
ment of Agriculture to exercise its more extensive authority.

6. Private Remedy. A private remedy of twice any pecuniary
loss, together with costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, was pro-

vided for violations of injunctions issued under section 100.18.72 An
identical private remedy had previously existed for violations of
7
special or general orders under section 100.20. 1

C. Other State Regulatory Laws
In addition to the trade practice authority of the Departments
of Agriculture and Justice under chapter 100, at least ten other
state agencies 74 have been vested with substantial regulatory au66. Wis. STAT. § 100.26(6) (1971).
67. Under Wis. STAT. § 100.26(3) (1971) any person who intentionally violates a general
or special order is punishable by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $5,000 or may be
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
Under Wis. STAT. § 100.26(5) (1971) any person violating Wis. STAT. § 100.18(9) (1971),
which prohibits bait and switch advertising, may be fined not less than $100 nor more than
$1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
WIs. STAT. § 100.26(1) (1971) provides for a fine not to exceed $200 or imprisonment
for not more than six months, or both, for violations of ch. 100 for which no specific penalty
is prescribed.
68. Wis. STAT. § 100.18(11)(c) (1971).
69. WIS. STAT. § 100.20(6) (1971).
70. WiS. STAT. § 100.18(1 l)(d) (1971).
71. Id.
72. WiS. STAT § 100.18(l1)(b) 2 (1971).
73. Wis. STAT. § 100.20(5) (1971).
74. These agencies include: the Office of the Commissioner of Banking, the Office of
the Commissioner of Credit Unions, the Educational Approval Board, the Office of the
Commissioner of Insurance, the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, the
Department of Natural Resources, the Public Service Commission, the Office of the Commissioner of Savings and Loans, the Office of the Commissioner of Securities and the
Department of Transportation.
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thority over a wide range of commercial activities in Wisconsin.
Although an examination of each of these agencies and their activities is beyond the scope of this article, two recently enacted laws

of major significance which deal, inter alia, with unfair and deceptive business practices should be briefly discussed in passing.
1. Wisconsin Consumer Act
The Wisconsin Consumer Act75 was enacted after years of intensive study and debate" concerning the need for modernization

of Wisconsin's fragmented and outdated credit laws.77 Not only
had these credit laws been written long before the mushrooming

of consumer credit after World War II,78 but they predated the
75. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 239.
76. As early as 1960, Governor Nelson appointed an eight man Committee on Revolving Credit and Installment Sales to prepare appropriate state credit legislation following
the Governor's veto of Wis. S.B. 256 (1959 Sess.). Although no legislation resulted from
the Committee's work, the usury law penalties were made substantially stronger in 1961 as
a result of the efforts of several of the members of the Committee. Wis. Laws 1961, ch.
431. The presence of these tougher penalties proved to be a significant factor in the ultimate
enactment of the Wisconsin Consumer Act following the ruling in State v. J. C. Penney,
48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970), that revolving charge accounts were subject to the
state usury law (Wis. STAT. § 138.05(1) (1969)). After the passage of the Consumer Act
with the support of the Wisconsin Merchants Federation, the legislature made the usury
law penalties inoperative as to credit sales violations occurring prior to the Penney decision.
Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 308, creating Wis. STAT. § 138.06(6) and (7) (1971).
An extensive study of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) was also conducted
by an Advisory Committee to the Insurance and Banking Legislative Committee. The
Advisory Committee was comprised of legislators and representatives of consumer groups,
labor and the credit-granting industry. The Committee studied the UCCC for more than
two years between 1969 and 1971 and recommended a revised version of the UCCC for
enactment by the legislature. However, the Committee's version of the UCCC was discredited in large part because of the resignation of the consumer and labor representatives over
a dispute concerning the extent of industry representation on the Committee. Thereafter,
a coalition of various interest groups drafted and sponsored the Wisconsin Consumer Act.
For a detailed review of the events leading to the negotiation and ultimate passage of the
Act, see Davis, Legislative Restrictions of CreditorPowers and Remedies, A Case Study
of the Negotiation and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 MICH. L. REV. 3
(1973).
77. Prior to the Consumer Act, loan transactions were regulated by a variety of statutes,
primarily Wis. STAT. §§ 138.05, 138.07 and 138.09 (1969) and Wis. STAT. ch. 214 (1969).
Automobile credit sales were regulated by Wis. STAT. § 218.01 (1969), while most other
credit sales were unregulated. Revolving charge accounts, however, were subject to the state
usury law as a result of the holding in State v. J.C. Penney, supra note 76. Such patchwork
legislative treatment of consumer credit became increasingly artificial over the years as
credit institutions' functions and services expanded and ultimately overlapped, thus blurring
previous distinctions. See CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 3 (1965).
78. Total outstanding consumer credit (excluding real estate mortgage credit) grew
from 21.5 billion in 1950 to 137.2 billion in 1971, an increase of over five times. REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CREDIT FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES 5

(1972).
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development of many abusive and uncontrolled credit practices as

well as such important new credit devices as retail revolving charge
accounts and bank charge card plans.79 The Consumer Act, by

comprehensively revising Wisconsin's laws governing consumer
credit transactions, reaches virtually every kind of consumer credit
financing arrangement while providing substantially increased pro-

tection for consumers. 0

Among the primary purposes of the Wisconsin Consumer Act
is the protection of consumers against unfair and deceptive practices.8 1 In particular, there are several sections which specifically

dovetail with sections 100.18 and 100.2082 by prohibiting false,
misleading or deceptive credit advertising83 or conduct 4 in consumer credit transactions. The Act also broadly prohibits unconscionable conduct in consumer credit transactions. 85 Violation of

79. For a historical review of the development of consumer credit, see Curran, supra
note 77, 5-14.
80. WIS. STAT. chs. 421-427 (1971). See, Generally, Crandall, The Wisconsin Consumer
Act: Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws Before and After, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 334, and E.
Heiser, Wisconsin Consumer Act-A CriticalAnalysis, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 389 (1974).
81. WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2) (b) (1971).
82. WIS. STAT. § 421.103(4) (1971), provides as follows:
This act shall not preempt the administration or enforcement of ch. 100. Conduct
proscribed under §§ 423.301, 426.108, 426.109 or 426.110 may also constitute violations of §§ 100.18 or 100.20.
83. WIs. STAT. § 423.301 (1971). Although the prohibitory language of this section is
substantially identical to § 100.18, the scope is limited to media advertising, concerning the
extension of credit. At the same time, however, this provision goes beyond § 100.18 by
making the omission of material information a violation if the omitted information ".
is necessary to make the statements therein not false, misleading or deceptive."
84. WIs. STAT. § 426.109 (1971). The Act also requires the Administrator to promulgate
rules declaring specific conduct to be unconscionable. Wis. STAT. § 426.108 (1971).
85. WIS. STAT. § 425.107 (1971). The list of factors to be considered in determining
unconscionability under §§ 425.107(3) and 426.108 include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(a) That the practice unfairly takes advantage of of the lack of knowledge,
ability, experience or capacity of customers;
(b) That those engaging in the practice know of the inability of customers to
receive benefits properly anticipated from the goods or services involved;
(c) That there exists a gross disparity between the price of goods or services and
their value as measured by the price at which similar goods or services are readily
obtainable by other customers, or by other tests of true value;
(d) That the practice may enable merchants to take advantage of the inability of
customers reasonably to protect their interests by reason of physical or mental
infirmities, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the agreement, ignorance or lack of education or similar factors;
(e) That the terms of the transaction require customers to waive legal rights;
(f) That the terms of the transaction require customers to unreasonably jeopardize money or property beyond the money or property immediately at issue in the
transaction;
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these provisions carry a broady range of remedies, including injunctive relief88 and the recovery of civil penalties"7 by any customer
or the administrator." Class action relief, however, for victims of
false, misleading, deceptive or unconscionable conduct is severely
curtailed under the Act. 9

2.

Wisconsin Franchise Investment Law

Other than the Consumer Act, the most significant trade regulation legislation enacted by the 1971 legislature was the Wisconsin
Franchise Investment Law.9" The Franchise Investment Law was

sponsored by Attorney General Warren" to regulate the booming
franchise industry 2 after numerous complaints had been received
by the Department of Justice concerning deceptive advertising and
income projections by franchise promoters.9 3 The new law re(g) That the natural effect of the practice would reasonably cause or aid in
causing customers to misunderstand the true nature of the transaction or their rights
and duties thereunder;
(h) That the writing purporting to evidence the obligation of the customer in the
transaction contains terms or provisions or authorizes practices prohibited by law;
and
(i) Definitions of unconscionability in statues, regulations, rulings and decisions
of legislative, administrative or judicial bodies.
86. WIs. STAT. § 426.109 (1971).
87. Wis. STAT. § 426.301(1) (1971), provides that the Administrator may recover not
less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each violation of the Act. This amount may be
increased under Wis. STAT. § 426.301(2) (1971) to not less than $1,000 and not more than
$10,000 if the violation was knowing and willful.
For unconscionable conduct, the customer may recover $100 plus actual damages pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 425.303 (1971). Customers who have been induced to consummate a
consumer credit transaction as a result of false, misleading or deceptive advertising in
violation of Wis. STAT. § 423.301 (1971) may retain the goods, services or money received
without obligation to pay any part of the transaction total and may recover any sums paid
to the merchants pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 425.305 (1971).
88. The Administrator under the Act is the Commissioner of Banking who may bring
civil actions through the Department of Justice. Wis. STAT. § 426.104(1)(a) (1971).
89. WIs. STAT. § 426.110(3) (1971), provides that:
Notwithstanding this chapter, no class action may be maintained for conduct
proscribed in sub. (2) or for a violation of s. 423.301, 425.107, 426.108 or
427.104(l)(h) unless such conduct has been found to constitute a violation of this act
at least 30 days prior to the occurrence of the conduct involved in such class action
by an appellate court of this state or by a regulation issued by the administrator as
provided in ss. 426.104(a)(e) and 426.108 specifying with particularity the act or
practice in question.
90. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 241, creating Wis. STAT. ch. 553 (1971).
91. Wis. S. B. 784 (1971 Sess.).
92. Annual nationwide franchise sales are in the neighborhood of $100 billion according
to the Federal Trade Commission. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONSUMER BULLETIN No.
4, Advice for Persons who are considering an Investment in a Franchise Business (1971).

93. 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, OFFICE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 3 and 7.
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quires a varity of disclosures to be made to franchise prospects
prior to the signing of the franchise contract and requires that
materials used in the promotion and sale of franchises be submitted
to the Commissioner of Securities for review prior to their use
unless such review is exempted by administrative rule. 4 Violations
are subject to a variety of remedies and penalties, including injunctive and restitutionary relief substantially identical to section
95
100.18 (11)(d).
III.

REGULATION

OF UNFAIR

TRADE

PRACTICES

UNDER

SECTION 100.20
With the presence of stronger civil remedies for violations of
special or general orders issued under section 100.20, the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture has become more assertive in regulating unfair trade practices and unfair methods of competition. As
a result, a significant body of unfair trade practice law has developed in Wisconsin over the past several years.
A. The Concept of Unfairness
The authority of Department of Agriculute to enjoin and forbid
unfair trade practices and methods of competition through the
issuance of special or general orders has been upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as a valid delegation of legislative power."
This decision was based upon an earlier opinion97 which upheld a
legislative delegation to the Governor under the Wisconsin Recovery Act to promulgate codes or standards of unfair methods of
competition and unfair trade practices in business. In that opinion
the Wisconsin Supreme Court described the power to promulgate
codes regulating trade practices and methods of competition as
follows:
Methods of competition in business and trade practices are divided by the act into two classes-those which are fair and those
which are unfair. If from the whole body of methods of competi94. WIs. STAT. §§ 553.21, et seq. (1971).
95. WIs. STAT. § 553.54 (1971). In addition, Wis. STAT. § 553.78 (1971) makes it clear
that jurisdiction under Wis. STAT. §§ 100.18 or 100.20 (1971) is not preempted by the
Franchise Investment Act. For a detailed review of the Franchise Investment Law, see Mett,
The Wisconsin FranchiseInvestment Law, 45 Wis. BAR BULL., No. 5, 30 (1972).
96. H. M. Distributors of Milwaukee v. Department of Agriculture, 55 Wis. 2d 261,
272, 198 N.W.2d 598, 605 (1972); State v. Texaco, 14 Wis. 2d 625, 111 N.W.2d 918 (1961);
Ritholz v. Ammon, 240 Wis. 578, 4 N.W.2d 173 (1942).
97. In re Petition of State ex rel. Attorney General, 220 Wis. 25, 264 N.W. 633 (1936).
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tion in business and trade practices we eliminate those which are
unfair, those which remain are fair methods of competition and
fair trade practices. There is a vast fundamental difference between the power to make a rule and regulation which will eliminate an unfair trade practice or unfair method of competition in
business, discovered upon investigation, and the power to prescribe a code of fair competition. .

.

. A rule or regulation

whether in the affirmative or negative may eliminate such a practice. However, there may be many parallel fair trade practices.
Suppose in a particular respect there are a dozen. The power to
choose one among these fair trade practices and fair methods of
competition and require conformity to that practice or method
and so denounce all others as unfair is to exercise the kind of
legislative power that may not be delegated because there is no
standard which governs the action of the administrative agency
in making its choice. When it picks out one method or practice
from a group of fair methods and fair practices, it exercises pure
legislative discretion. That particular method or practice so chosen cannot be discovered by any process of fact-finding. . ..
Thus, under section 100.20, the Department of Agriculture cannot arbitrarily single out one fair practice from a number of other
fair practices and make it the sole standard of business conduct.
The department clearly does possess the authority, however, to
adopt codes or issue special orders which prohibit or regulate practices found to be unfair.
In assessing the fairness of a particular business practice, the
Department of Agriculture has been largely guided by the rules and
decisions under section 5 of the FTC Act. 9 Congress, in creating
section 5, deliberately left to the Commission the task of deciding
what practices should be denominated unfair."' Moreover, the
Commission is not limited to existing standards of criminal 1 or
fraudulent' conduct in determining unfairness. Thus, a broad and
flexible standard has developed which involves an examination of
numerous public policy considerations in determing whether a par98. Id. at 40-41, 264 N.W. 640.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
100. FTC v. Sperry Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 232, 239-240 (1972); FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708-709 (1948).
101. The early case of FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934),
remains the leading case on this point.
102. D.D.D. Corp. v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir., 1949); Wolfv. F.T.C., 135 F.2d
564 (7th Cir. 1943).
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ticular act or practice should be declared unfair. 03 In carrying out
this broad concept of unfairness, the Federal Trade Commission
has envisioned its role as follows:
The Commission was not intended to be a simple enforcement agency, charged with preventing well-understood, clearly
defined, unlawful conduct. Its principle function was.

. .

to ex-

plore, identify and define those competitive practices that should
be forbidden as "unfair" because contrary to public policy. The
commission was expected to proceed not only against practices
forbidden by statute or common law, but also against practices
not previously considered unlawful, and thus to create a new
body of law - a law of unfair competition adapted to the diverse
and changing needs of the complex evolving modern American
economy.' 04
Subsequently, this interpretation of the range of Federal Trade
Commission authority and responsibility was substantially supported by the United States Supreme Court in the celebrated S &
H decision.' 5 One of the principal issues in that case was whether
the Federal Trade Commission is empowered to prohibit practices
which are unfair to consumers irrespective of their competitive
impact. Although the court ordered the case remanded to the Federal Trade Commission for further proceedings to link the findings
and conclusions as to unfairness," 6 it strongly affirmed the Federal
Trade Commission's authority to proscribe unfair practices which
are injurious to consumers by stating:
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that
103. The Federal Trade Commission has described the factors to be taken into consideration as follows:
(I) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered
unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common
law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of
some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether
it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen). . . . 29 FED. REG.
8324, 8355 (1964) (Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Cigarette Advertising.)
See generally Comment, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act - Unfairness to
Consumers, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1071.
104. 29 FED. REG. 8349 (1964).
105. FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 232 (1972).
106. Id. at 248. This is required by § 557(c) of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act. Under Wisconsin law decisions of administrative agencies cannot be "Unsupported by
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted." WIs. STAT. § 227.20(1)(d)
(1971).
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the Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive
power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but
congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of
equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in
the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws."17
Several recent special order proceedings before the Department
of Agriculture illustrate the broad application of these standards
of unfairness in Wisconsin. In the matter of Mary Posnanski,"31
involved the rental of dilapidated residential dwellings in the inner
city of Milwaukee which were in violation of the Milwaukee Housing Code. Several of the buildings had actually been placarded and
condemned as unfit for human habitation. After a two day hearing,
the Department of Agriculture concluded that Posnanski was engaged in unfair business practices by renting such dwellings without disclosing the existence of the housing code violations. The
Department ordered the respondent to cease and desist from renting condemned dwellings until necessary repairs were made or
from renting dwellings with housing code violations without prior
disclosure of such violations to prospective tenants.10 9 On appeal " '
Posnanski raised a number of challenges to the order, including an
argument that section 100.20 was unconstitutionally vague and
should be limited to prior Federal Trade Commission rulings prohibiting specific unfair practices. Reserve Circuit Judge Currie
concluded that the concept of unfairness is designed to be adaptable to the changing needs of society and could be applied to new
practices. "' The court also upheld the application of section 100.20
to landlord-tenant transactions by re-affirming the policy concerns
expressed in Pines v. Perssion,"2 as follows:
The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people
in this era of rapid population increases is too important to be
rebuffed by that obnoxious cliche, caveat emptor. Permitting
landlords to rent "tumble-down" houses is at least a contributing
cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency, and
high property taxes for conscientious landowners.
In the matter of Peter Subola,"3 involved a special order pro107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
No. 923

F.T.C. v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 232, 244 (1972).
No. 877 (Wis. Dept. of Ag).
Id., November 15, 1971.
Posnanski v. Department of Agriculture, No. 135-091 (Cir. Ct. Dane County).
Id., Memorandum Decision, May 21, 1973.
14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 11 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961).
In the Matter of Peter Subola, d/b/a American Home Improvement Company,
(Wis. Dept. of Ag).
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ceeding commenced by the Department of Justice against a contractor who chronically failed to complete home improvement
work as represented. After a public hearing, the Department of
Agriculture declared that Subola was engaging in unfair business
practices in violation of section 100.20. However, in addition to the
standard prohibitions relating to misrepresentations of fact, the
Department of Agriculture ordered' 14 Subola to cease and desist
from accepting any deposit or payment where the work would not
be completed within sixty days and imposed a positive obligation
that all his future contracts be in writing and include a specific
completion date. Although the order was not appealed, the terms
therein were subsequently incorporated in two circuit court orders
5
issued against Subola.1
In the matterof Inksetter,"6 involved the so-called "term paper
mills" which have sprung up on various college campuses across
the country. In Inksetter the Department of Justice sought a ruling
declaring the advertising and sale of term papers and take home
examinations for use by students as their original work to be an
unfair business practice. After a hearing, the Department of Agriculture held that the sale of term papers was ". . .inimical to the
best interest of the student, the college or university he attends, and

the public alike.

.... 111

In forbidding the sale of term papers as

a new breed of unfair practice, the Department relied heavily on
Federal Trade Commission precedent ranging from Keppell" to
the S & H"9 case.
Although the Department of Agriculture has yet to explore
such emerging Federal Trade Commission concerns as corrective
advertising, ad substantiation, and restitutionary orders,' it is
clear that the department envisions the breadth of its substantive
authority to be at least as extensive as that of the federal trade
commission. Indeed, in the areas of rulemaking and affirmative
disclosure requirements, the department has been able to assert
itself more vigorously than the federal trade commission because
114. Id., April 19, 1971.
115. State v. Subola, No. CR-8-478 (Cir. Ct. Dane County, Sept. 25, 1973); State v.
Subola, No. 135-457 (Cir. Ct. Dane County, May 18, 1972).
116. In the Matter of Bruce and Agnus Inksetter, d/b/a Academic Marketplace, No.
997 (Wis. Dept. of Ag).
117. Id., Undated Opinion of the Examiner 13 (1972).
118. Supra note 101.
119. Supra note 100.
120. See Thain, Advertising Regulation, the ContemporaryFTC Approach, I FORDHAM
URBAN

L. J. 349 (1973).
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of its specific authority to issue rules and order the employment
of fair practices.
B. Rulemaking
The authority of the Department of Agriculture to promulgate
industry-wide general orders is at least as extensive as that of any

other state trade regulation agency in the nation.121 In exercising
this broad authority, the Department has promulgated orders

which cover the entire gamut of consumer transactions from advertising inducements through the ultimate performance of the contract by the merchant.12 In addition, the orders extend well beyond
consumer transactions to inchoate antitrust'2 and price discrimination' 24 practices. Perhaps most importantly, the orders carry the

force and effect of statutory law.'2
Although a working knowledge of each of the general orders
is not essential for most practitioners in the trade regulation or
commercial field, several of the orders are quite broad in scope and

are of general interest. A review of these follows.
121. Note, Developments in the Law, Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005,
1119-1134 (1967).
122. The following listing of the general orders promulgated under Wis. STAT. §
100.20(2) (1971) illustrates the wide range of subject matter covered.
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 108 (1974) - Egg Sizes, unfair practices
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 109 (1974) - Freezer meat and food service plan trade practices
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 110 (1974) - Home improvement
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 111 (1974) - Leaf tobacco, buying and selling
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 112 (1974) - Motor fuel trade practices
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 113 (1974) - Gasoline advertising
Wis. ADMI. CODE, ch. Ag 114 (1974) - Real estate advertising, advance fees
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 116 (1974) - Deceptive offers of employment
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 118 (1974) - Brewers, unfair sales discrimination
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 121 (1974) - Referral selling plans
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 122 (1974) - Chain distributor schemes
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 124 (1974) - Price comparison advertising
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 125 (1974) - Mobile home parks
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 127 (1974) - Home solicitation selling
Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 128 (1974) - Academic material unfair trade practices.
123. Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 125 (1974), for example, lists in its declaration of policy
the effect of certain practices as placing ". . . a substantial number of [mobile home]
operators and dealers in a dominant market or monopoly position ..
"
124. Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 112 (1974), for example, regulates price discrimination
in the sale of gasoline to suppliers or wholesalers and Wis. ADM. CODE, cl. Ag 118 (1974),
regulates price discrimination in the sale of malt beverages to wholesalers.
125. State v. Texaco, 14 Wis. 2d 625, 111 N.W.2d 918 (1961). As a result, contracts in
violation of the orders are void and unenforceable. Perma Stone v. Merkel, 255 Wis. 565,
39 N.W.2d 730 (1949). It should be noted, however, that even though the contract is void,
the contractor may recover the fair value of work performed under the doctrine of quantum
meruit. Zbichorski v. Thomas, 10 Wis. 2d 625, 103 N.W.2d 536 (1960).
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1. Home Improvement Trade Practices Code" 6
The Home Improvement Code is no doubt the most comprehensive, and perhaps the most significant, general order that has
been promulgated by the Department of Agriculture. Although the
Code dates back more than thirty years, it has been amended twice

in the past five years to keep it abreast of certain new abuses and
industry practices. The most recent'27 also substantially expands
the scope of the Code from improvements "attached" to an existing home or building to such new matters as the construction,

installation or repair of driveways, terraces, patios, and fences as
well as other improvements to the "residential or non-commercial
premises."'11
The Code deals with a virtual laundry list of unfair or deceptive
home improvement practices that have resulted in substantial financial losses to home owners over the years.2 Practices such as
model home presentations, 3 ° bait and switch advertising,'

phony gift offers, 32 and gaining entry to the buyer's home under

the guise of a governmental inspector 33 are either prohibited
outright or severely curtailed by the Code. In addition, a long list
of specific product misrepresentations are proscribed.' The Code

also regulates price and financing representations, 3 1 contract
termS36 and performance 37 in home improvement transactions.
Finally, the Code prohibits the taking of negotiable instruments in
126. Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 110 (1974).
127. Wis. Adm. Reg., May 1974, No. 221, eff. June 1, 1974.
128. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.01(1) (1974).
129. Some observers have estimated the cost of phony home repair schemes as amounting to approximately one billion dollars each year. See Note, Translating Sympathy for
Deceived Consumers into Effective Programsfor Protection, 114 U PENN. L. REv. 395
(1966).
130. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.02(1) (1974).
131. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.02(3) (1974).
132. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.02(5) (1974).
133. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.02(4) (1974).
134. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.02(2) (1974).
135. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.02(6) (1974).
136. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.05 (1974).
137. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.05(2)(d) (1974), requires setting forth the date or time
period on or within which the work is to.begin and be completed by the seller. Wis. ADM.
CODE, § Ag 110.02(7)(b) (1974), prohibits, with certain exceptions, failing to begin or
complete work within the time period agreed upon. These provisions were added in 1974
after evidence was received that failure to perform constituted the most prevalent complaint
in the home improvement industry. And see Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d
312 (1963), which recognized a tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result
of faulty and untimely performance of a home improvement contract.
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home improvement sales and provides that every assignee of a
home improvement
contract takes subject to all claims and defen138
ses of the buyer.
The classic example of how the above unfair practices are used
and perpetuated over an extended period of time is the renowned
Holland Furnace Company operation. The Holland salesmen
would often gain entrance into a home by representing that they
were government agents, gas or utility company inspectors, or
heating engineers."' They would then tear down or dismantle the
owner's furnace, often without permission, on the pretext of inspecting it or cleaning it. They would then refuse to reassemble the
furnace in order to coerce the owner into signing a release absolving Holland of liability. The salesmen also employed scare tactics
in selling, such as falsely representing that the old furnace would
asphyxiate the customer's family, burn up or blow up. 4 ' Despite
these onerous practices and the fact Holland did business in fortyfour states and had gross annual sales totalling at least $30 million,
it took the Federal Trade Commission nearly two years before a
cease and desist order could be issued against Holland in 1958.141

This order was then stayed while Holland appealed twice to the
United States Supreme Court.' Even then the company failed to
discontinue its fraudulent practices. This resulted in further litigation and, ultimately, the imposition of heavy fines on company
officials for noncompliance with the 1958 order.4
It is largely because of the magnitude and tenacity of the Holland Furnace Company operation and similar schemes that regulations such as the home improvement code have been adopted which
permit prompt action' against flagrant home repair abuses.
138. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 110.06 (1974). This provision was originally adopted in
1970 and was modified in 1974 to bring it into conformance with Wis STAT. §§422.406 and
422.407.
139. In the Matter of Holland Furnace Co., 55 FTC 55 (1958).
140. Id.
141. See Holland Furnance Company v. FTC, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
142. Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. den. 361 U.S.
928 (1960), 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
143. In re Holland Furnace Company, 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. den. 381 U.S.
924 (1965).
144. In State v. Spanky Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., et al., No. 404-505 (Cir. Ct.
Milwaukee County, Nov. 17, 1972), for example, the Justice Department was able to obtain
a temporary injunction under Wis. STAT. § 100.20(6) against a furnace repair firm which
allegedly engaged in practices similar to Holland Furnace within one month after the
commencement of formal action.
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Referral Selling Plans1 5
Referral selling plans are devices used primarily by door-todoor sales companies to obtain sales leads. Although individual
referral plans differ in many respects, they all contain as a common
ingredient the offer of some type of compensation to the buyer in
2.

return for the submission of names of potential customers to the
seller.

In recent years referral plans in which the earning of compensation is contingent upon future sales have been prohibited in a number of jurisdictions.146 The United States Post Office Department
has taken the position that the use of the mail to further such
referral schemes violates the postal fraud statute14 7 and at least two
court of appeals decisions have sustained this position. "8 Numer-

ous state court decisions have also struck down such referral plans
as fraudulent or unconscionable sales schemes. "'

The primary basis for challenging contingent referral plans,
however, has been under the lottery laws. 15 The leading case on
the application of the lottery laws' to such plans is the State of

Washington's Sherwood & Roberts decision."' The court in that
case concluded that the amount of referral commissions which a
145. Wis. ADM. CODE, ch.Ag 121 (1974).
146. See generally Annot., Enforceability of Transactions Entered into Pursuant to
Referral Sales Arrangement, 14 A.L.R.3d 1420; Dodge, Referral Sales Contracts: To Alter
or Abolish?, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 669 (1966).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
148. Blachly v. U.S., 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir., 1967); Fabian v. U.S., 358 F.2d 187 (8th
Cir., 1966).
149. Supra note 146. The leading case is State of New York v. ITM Inc., 52 Misc. 2d
39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
150. In two states, Ohio and Oklahoma, such plans were held not to constitute a lottery.
Yoder v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 566, 202 N.E.2d 329 (1963); Krehbiel v.
State, 378 P.2d 768 (Okla., 1963). Thereafter the courts of at least three states, Kentucky,
New York and Washington, held such plans to be in violation of their respective lottery
laws. Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (Ky., 1966); State of New York v. ITM,
Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966); Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v.
Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 630, 409 P.2d 160, 14 [ALR3d 1411 (1965). The attorneys general of
at least three other states, Delaware, Massachusetts and Missouri, have also concluded that
such plans violate the lottery laws of their states.
151. The three essential elements of a lottery are a prize, chance, and a consideration.
"Prize" is often defined as anything of value offered as an inducement to participate in a
scheme. 38 AM. JUR. 2d, Gambling, § 8. The generally accepted definition of "chance" is
Justice Holmes' succinct statement that "What a man does not know and cannot find out
is chance as to him, and is recognized as chance by the law." Dillingham v. McLaughlin,
264 U.S. 370, 373 (1924). "Consideration" is generally anything that is sufficient to sustain
a simple contract. 38 AM. JUR. 2d. Gambling, § 7.
152. 67 Wash. 2d 630, 409 P.2d 160, 14 ALR3d 1411 (1965).
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customer might, receive for supplying names of other potential
customers largely depends upon the element of chance:
The lack of control feature in referral selling is much broader
than that designated by the trial court. It is inherent in referral
selling that purchasers such as respondents be without control.
Sooner or later, the market, unknowingly, to the pruchasers, will
become saturated. This principle is the same as in the chain letter
scheme. The case at hand is a classic example.
The Lifetown salesman told respondents that they could get
something for nothing through the referral selling scheme. Respondents are obligated to pay $1,187.28 for equipment costing
$225.32. For ease of demonstration, respondents must earn 12
commissions of $100 each in order to get, as promised, something
for nothing. This means that 12 of respondents' referrals must
purchase as respondents did; they, in turn, to get something for
nothing, must find 12 more people to purchase, and so forth, as
follows:

1st round
2nd round
3rd round
4th round
5th round

Number of Purchasers
1
12
144
1,728
20,736
248,832

Soon the scheme will run itself out; the market will become
saturated. Here, Lifetone made its first sale in May, 1963, and
its last sale in October, 1963. The respondents entered the picture
in September. They gave the Lifetone salesman approximately
60 names at that time, and they never received a commission. In
fact, only $14,900 in commissions were paid in the Yakima area,
while the total number of sales was 137, totalling $129,947.04
(without finance charges).
Respondents took a chance on whether they could get something for nothing. This chance permeates the entire scheme of
referral selling. This court holds that the referral selling scheme
13
is a lottery. 1
Relying upon the Sherwood & Roberts decision and the restrictive view of lottery-type schemes in Wisconsin,' 4 the Wisconsin
153. Id. at _,
409 P.2d at 163-164.
154. See Kayden Industries, Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 724, 150 N.W.2d 447
(1967).
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Attorney General advised the Department of Agriculture in 1968155

that referral selling plans in which the awarding of a referral commission is contingent upon uncertain future sales constituted a

lottery under Wisconsin law.'56 The opinion also concluded that the
Department of Agriculture possessed the authority to prohibit such
referral plans under section 100.20 under the theory that the use

of.a lottery to promote business constitutes an unfair method of
57
competition.'
The referral selling plans code15 which resulted effectively deals

with the lottery aspects of referral selling by prohibiting referral
selling plans unless the compensation for referring customers is
paid prior to the initial sale.' Thus, any contingencies with respect
to payment are eliminated.'
Because of the strong nationwide trend towards declaring referral selling to be illegal, the referral selling code has not been suc-

cessfully challenged in any subsequent enforcement proceeding.
Moreover, the legislature has recently reaffirmed the policies un-

derlying the code by prohibiting contingent referral transactions as
part of the Wisconsin Consumer Act.'
82
3. Chain Distributor Schemes

The chain distributor code was promulgated in 197013 in response to a marketing phenomenon commonly known as multilevel or pyramid sales plans.6 4 Multi-level marketing plans arose
in the latter half of the 1960's on the crest of the franchise boom

and, by late 1972, had generated more than $300 million in invest155. 57 Wis. Op. ATTY. GEN. 68 (1968).
156. WIS. STAT. § 945.01(2) (1971).
157. Jones v. Smith Oil & Refining Co., 295 Ill. App. 519, 15 N.E.2d 42 (1938); FTC
v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); Featherstone v. Independent Service
Station Association, 10 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Glover v. Mallosha, 238 Mich.
216, 213 N.W. 107 (1927).
158. Supra note 145 (eff. January 1, 1969).
159. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 121.02 (1971).
160. In addition, by requiring that the compensation be paid prior to the sale, the code
prohibits the practice of inflating the regular price of a product so that a fictitious discount
can be offered to the buyer for providing names of prospective customers. In other words,
the code requires that any offer of compensation for providing referrals be separated from
the sale of the product.
161. Wis. STAT. § 422.416 (1971).
162. Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 122 (1974).
163. Wis. Adm. Reg., March, 1970, No. 171, eff. April 1, 1970.
164. For an in depth discussion of these marketing plans, see Ella, Multi-Level or
Pyramid Sales Systems; Fraud or Free Enterprise?, 18 [S.D.L. Rev. 358 (1973); Note,
Pyramid Schemes; Dare to Be Regulated, 61 GEo. L.J. 1257 (1973).
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ments from the public."6 5 The plans are typically presented to the
public at so-called "opportunity meetings" where professional
spielers or pitchinen artfully and emotionally appeal to the prospect's desire to be a "success," both financially and socially.
Although the schemes have been packaged as traditional mar-

keting plans with various distribution levels geared towards ultimate consumer sales, the principal financial attraction of the plans

stems from the profits that can be made by recruiting unlimited
numbers of other distributors into the program who, in turn, possess similar recruiting rights. Thus, a chain distributor scheme
shares certain common elements with chain letter schemes"' and
referral selling plans1 7 in that, if carried out to their logical conclusion, the entire world would be saturated with distributors of a
given company. In addition, misleading income representation
have not been uncommon in the presentation of the plans. The
result has been a plethora of litigation against multi-level operations initiated by virtually every state as well as several agencies
of the federal government.16

In Wisconsin, chain distribution schemes have long been condemned as contrary to public policy. In Twentieth Century Company v. Quilling,6 9 the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to en-

force a scheme in which territorial rights to sell a product were sold
to persons who would in turn sell similar territorial rights to others,
and so on ad infinitum. The court condemned the endless chain
aspect of the arrangements as follows:
We are unable to regard such a project as a legitimate busi165. According to William J. Casey, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in an address to the North American Securities Administrator's Association,
September 11, 1972.
166. Chain letter schemes have been declared illegal as lotteries under the mail lottery
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904);
New v.Tribond Sales Corp., 19 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1927). In addition, chain letter schemes
have been held to be lotteries in several states. See, for example, Kent v. City of Chicago,
301 III. App. 312, 22 N.E.2d 799 (1939); Niccoli v. Mc Clellant, 21 Cal. App. 2d 759, 65
P.2d 853 (1937). In Wisconsin a chain letter type scheme known as the pyramid club was
declared to be illegal as a lottery in 38 Wis. Op. ATr'y GEN. 152 (1949).
167. In at least two states chain distributorship schemes were actually successfully
prosecuted under statutes prohibiting referral selling. See State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., et al., 212 Kan. 668, 512 P.2d 416 (1973); State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa, 1971). Prosecution under either Wis. ADM.
CODE, ch. Ag 121 (1974) or Wis. STAT. § 422.416 (1971) would not be possible, however,
because their scope is limited to consumer transactions.
168. Supra note 164.
169. 130 Wis. 318, 110 N.W.174 (1906).
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ness enterprise. How large would be the number of purchasers
who would be induced by the prospect of large returns for little
labor to join the scheme it is impossible to say or even speculate.
Each purchaser would be desirous to get back at least as much
as he invested. In order to do this, the first purchaser under the
most favorable circumstances would have to sell rights aggregating $1,000, the second purchaser would have to sell rights aggregating $2,000, and thus the necessity of finding victims would
increase in geometrical progression until the purchasers who are
in the tenth place from the original purchasers must, in order
merely to reimburse themselves, find others who would pay more
than half a million dollars. Of course, it is not likely that the
scheme would last so long as this, but, however long it lasts, it
will infallibly leave a greater or less crowd of dupes at the end
with no opportunity to recoup their losses because the bubble has
at last burst. It contemplates an endless chain of purchasers, or
rather, a series of constantly multiplying endless chains, with
nothing but fading rainbows as the reward of those who are
unfortunate enough to become purchasers the moment before the
collapse of the scheme. While contemplating large gains to the
original promoters and early purchasers, it necessarily contemplates losses to the later purchasers; losses increasing in number
with the greater success of the scheme. .... 110

Similarly, in its statement of policy supporting the declaration
of chain distributor schemes as unfair trade practices, the Department of Agriculture emphasized that ".

.

. small investors . . .

anticipate unrealistic profits through use of the chance to further
perpetuate a chain of distributors, without regard to actual market
"171
conditions ....
The chain distributor code defines a "chain distributor scheme"
as a ".

.

. sales device whereby a person, upon a condition that

he make an investment, is granted a license or right to recruit for
profit one or more additional persons who also are granted such
72
license or right upon condition of making an investment ...
The code further provides that the existence of a limitation on the
number of participants does not change the identity of the
73
scheme.
170. Id. at 324, 110 N.W. at 176.
171. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 122.01 (1974).
172. WIs. ADM. CODE, § Ag 122.02(1) (1974).
173. Id. Although such a limitation eliminates the the endless chain aspect of the
scheme, the chain still exists as does the uncertainty concerning the number of prior and
potential participants.
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The chain distributor code has been constitutionally challenged
on several occasions. In H M Distributorsof Milwaukee v. Department of Agriculture, 74 a group of Holiday Magic distributors
argued that the code exceeded the Department of Agriculture's
authority under section 100.20, that it was void for vagueness, that
it infringed on the right of the participant to make the economic
investment he chooses and that it violated the right of freedom of
speech. The court upheld the Department's authority to prohibit
chain distributor schemes as unfair trade practices and held that
the words chosen to do so were reasonably definite and certain.
The court rejected plaintiff's theory that every participant in the
scheme is entitled to constitutional protection in making any economic investment he choses by responding that "[e]very bucketshop operator would applaud the statement, although he might be
surprised to have it claimed that the right of his customers to be
75
defrauded is somewhere in the United States Constitution."'
With respect to the free speech argument, the court relied upon the
line of federal cases that excludes commercial activity from the
constitutional protection afforded free speech, 76 and concluded:
The role of the "spieler" in inducing prospective purchasers to
invest their money is not to be underestimated. Whether the
proposition is a chance in a carnival shell game or buying a piece
of real estate or a share of stock in a legitimate business enterprice, the selling of it involves speaking or writing, almost always. However, the right to regulate or prohibit derives from the
nature of the undertaking, what is being done or attempted, not
what is said in explaining or selling it. . . .Speaking is involved,
but the right to prohibit as an unfair trade practice the chain
distributor scheme derives from what is being peddled and how
it is being peddled. The right to regulate or prohibit derives from
the unfairness of what is done and the scheme is not saved by the
sales pitch that accompanies it.'77
It now appears that the multi-level phenomenon has peaked
and is in its decline. It also appears that having already survived
one constitutional challenge in the Wisconsin Supreme Court the
chain distributor code will not be overturned despite the continued
174. 55 Wis. 2d 261, 198 N.W.2d 598 (1972).
175. Id. at 271-272, 198 N.W.2d at 604.
176. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
177. Supra note 174 at 273, 198 N.W.2d at 605.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

efforts of certain multi-level firms 78 to convince the courts of the

wisdom of their ingenious theories.
Price Comparison Advertising Code1 9
The comparison price advertising code is one of the newest'
and most complex rules of the Department of Agriculture. It may
also prove to be the most far-reaching since virtually every seller
4.

engages in some form of price comparison advertising.
The concept of comparative price advertising is probably as old

as the art of selling itself. When not abused, it is an effective selling
technique, beneficial to seller and buyer alike. However, in recent
years the use of fictitious or distorted comparative savings claims

has increased 8' and has no doubt contributed to the loss of confidence in the overall credibility of advertising.8 2 Drafting effective
standards that meet the diverse marketing and selling practices of
the whole spectrum of retail selling has nonetheless proved exceed-

ingly difficult. The Federal Trade Commission's Guides Against
Deceptive Pricing"" are vague and general and have been rarely

enforced even under their most restrictive interpretation. Most
state and local authorities have either adopted and laxly applied

the Federal Trade Commission guides under their own consumer
fraud laws or have chosen to ignore the problem area. Thus, the
drafting of a specific price comparison code for Wisconsin became
a laborious and controversial project involving numerous drafts
178. In Holiday Magic v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Wis. 1973), Federal District
Judge Reynolds dismissed a complaint brought by several multi-level firms which requested
the convening of a three-judge panel to consider the constitutional validity of the chain
distributor code. In addition to the free speech and vagueness arguments that had previously
been rejected in H.M. Distributors of Milwaukee, Supra note 174, the court also rejected a
series of other challenges to the validity of the code, namely that it was preempted by federal
law, that it impaired the distributor's "right to work," that it amounted to an impairment
of contracts, that it denied equal protection and that it was an undue burden on interstate
commerce. On appeal the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's order of dismissal and
remanded the case with directions to convene a three-judge district court on the ground that
the district court had invaded the province of the three-judge panel by adjudicating the
merits of the constitutional contentions. Holiday Magic, Inc., et al. v. Warren, et. al.,
F.2d (7th Cir. 1974).
179. Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 124 (1971).
180. Wis. Adm. Reg., July 1973, No. 211, eff. Jan 1, 1974.
181. According to extensive testimony of Department of Agriculture and Milwaukee
Better Business Bureau officials at hearings to consider promulgation of a comparison price
advertising code.
182. Approximately half of the public now says advertising is either fairly or very
unbelievable according to a study by the Opinion Research Corporation (Sept., 1973).
183. 16 C.F.R., pt. 233 (1970).
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over a period of several years.8 4
Basically, the code regulates three types of direct price comparisons: 185 (1) Comparisons between a seller's price and a price at
which the seller offered or sold merchandise in the past;' 8 (2)
Comparisons between a seller's price and a price at which the
merchandise will be offered in the future;"' and (3) Comparisons
between a seller's price and that of a competitor.88 Where the
comparison relates to a former price of the seller (e.g., "Formerly
priced at $10.00, now $8.00"), the item compared must either have
been sold at that price within the last 90 days immediately preceding the date of the advertisement8 9 or it must have been offered
for sale for at least 4 weeks during such 90 day period and, on at
least one occasion during such period, it must have been offered
at the price stated in the advertisement.8 ' If the comparison does
not relate to an item sold or offered for sale during the 90 day
period, the date, time or seasonal period of such sale or offer must
be disclosed in the advertisement. 9' In any case, the code provides
that no price comparison may be made based upon ". . . a price
which exceeds . . . [the seller's] . . . cost plus normal markup

regularly used by him in the sale of such property or serv12
ices ....
Where the comparison relates to a seller's future price (e.g.,
"Now $5.00, next month $7.00"), the future price must take effect
on the date disclosed in the advertisement or within 90 days after
the price comparison is stated in the ad.9 3 The stated future price
must then be maintained by the seller "for a period of at least 4
weeks after its effective date, except where compliance becomes
'9 4
impossible because of circumstances beyond his control.'
Where the comparison relates to a competitor's price (e.g.,
184. See accounts of the final hearings and the preceding controversy with respect to
the development of the code in the Milwaukee Journal, May 6, 1973, at § 1, P.17, col.4,
and the Capitol Times (Madison), May 4, 1973, at 34, col.6.
185. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.02(5) (1974), defines "price comparison" as"... the
direct comparison, in any advertisement, of a seller's current price for consumer property
or services with any other price or statement of value for such property or services expressed
in dollars, cents, fractions or percentages."
186. Wis. ADM. CODE, §§ Ag. 124.04 and 124.05 (1974).
187. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.06 (1974).
188. Wis. ADM. CODE. § Ag 124.07 (1974).
189. Wis. ADM. CODE, § 124.04(1) (1974).
190. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.05(1) (1974).
191. WIs. ADMI. CODE, §§ 124.04(2) and 124.05(2) (1974).
192. Wxs. ADM. CODE, §§ Ag 124.04(3) and 124.05(3) (1974).
193. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.06(2) (1974).
194. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.06(3) (1974).
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"Valued at $20.00, our price $15.00"), the code requires that the
competitor's price relate to property or services that were advertised or sold in the preceding 90 day period.19 In addition, the price
must be representative of prices at which such consumer property
are sold or advertised in the trade area in which the price comparison is made.19 The code also requires that the seller disclose that
the price used as a basis for the comparison was not the seller's
own price.' 97 Finally, the code requires that the seller conspicuously
disclose the general nature of the material differences in the property or services."'
One of the knottiest problem areas in the code relates to the
coverage of catalog sales. Catalogs are often printed well in advance of their distribution date and are mailed directly to Wiscon-

sin residents by firms operating in interstate commerce with no
other physical presence in the state. The code specifically deals
with the publication problem by defining the advertising "date" as
either ". . . the date of publication or distribution or the date on
which the completed advertising copy is submitted to the printer

for final printing and publication, provided such submission date
does not exceed 30 days from date of actual publication or distribu-

tion.""' With respect to regulating the price comparisons in catalogs mailed into Wisconsin, the Department of Agriculture is relying upon the trend of recent case law towards expanded state juris-

diction over foreign corporations which are doing business with a
state's citizen through the use of the mail."'0 It would also appear
that the legitimate concern of Wisconsin in protecting its citizens
from deceptive advertising claims would justify the incidental ef195. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.07(1) (1974).
196. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.07(2) (1974).
197. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.07(3) (1974).
198. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.03(2) (1974).
199. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 124.02(3) (1974). In addition, the effective date of the code
for catalog advertisements was delayed to July 1, 1974.
200. Starting with the United States Supreme Court decision in Travelers Health
Assoc. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950), the courts have substantially expanded the "minimum contacts" doctrine of International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945), in the area of mail order activities. The leading case is State of Washington v.
Readers Digest Ass'n., Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972), app. dism. 411 U.S.
945 (1973), which related to the application of the State of Washington's "Little FTC" Act
to the mailing of sweepstakes promotions to Washington State residents. And see Kugler
v. Market Development Corp., 124 N.J. Super. 314, 306 A.2d 489 (1973); Readers Digest
Ass'n. v. State ex rel. Conner, 251 So. 2d 552 (Fla., 1971); Ministers Life & Casualty Union
v. Haase, 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1965), app. dism. 385 U.S. 205 (1966), reh.
den. 385 U.S. 1033 (1967); People v. Fairfax Family Fund, Inc., 147 Cal. Rptr. 812, 235
Cal. App. 2d 881 (1965), app. dism. 382 U.S. 1 (1965).
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fect on interstate commerce of applying the code to out-of-state

merchants who direct advertising to Wisconsin residents in violation of the code.210
22
5. Home Solicitation Selling Code

The home solicitation selling code regulates consumer sales or
leases which are personally solicited or consummated at the
buyer's residence or place of business, at the seller's transient
quarters, or away from a seller's regular place of business. 23 The
'
code became effective in its present form on February 1, 197 3,
and applies to any person or organization "advertising, offering or
dealing in goods or services for the purpose of home solicitation
selling or providing or exercising supervision, direction' 2or
control
05
sale.
solicitation
home
the
in
used
practices
sales
over
201. The general rule is that state regulations involving a legitimate local interest are
not invalid under the Commerce Clause unless the burden on interstate commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970); Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440
(1945); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S.
52 (1914); In accord is Ritholz v. Ammon, 240 Wis. 578, 4 N.W.2d 173 (1942). Moreover,
the fact that Federal Trade Commission guidelines exist in the comparison price advertising
area is not fatal to the price comparison code so long as they are not in conflict. In DoubleEagle Lubricants, Inc. v. State of Texas, 248 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Tex., 1965), for example,
the application of a state labeling regulation to a foreign corporation was upheld despite
the fact that lower Federal Trade Commission standards existed with respect to the identical
subject matter. In accord is State v. Texaco, 14 Wis. 2d 625, 111 N.W.2d 918 (1961).
202. Wis. ADM. CODE, ch. Ag 127 (1974).
203. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 127.01(1) (1974). This section further defines "personal
solicitation" as including ". . . solicitation made directly by telephone, person-to-person
contact, or by written or printed communication other than general advertising indicating
a clear intent to sell goods or services at a regular place of business, and other than catalog
or mail solicitation not accompanied by any other solicitation."
204. Wis. Adm. Reg., January 1973, No. 205. The Code originally went into effect on
October 1, 1972, but was substantially amended thereafter, primarily to bring it into conformance with the Wisconsin Consumer Act.
205. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 127.01(3) (1974). In addition, the term "seller" includes a
supplier or distributor if:
(a) The seller is a subsidiary or affiliate of the supplier or distributor.
(b) The seller interchanges personnel or maintains common or overlapping officers or directors with the supplier or distributor; or
(c) The supplier or distributor provides or exercises supervision, direction or
control over the selling practices of the seller.
The Code's attempt to cut through the network of "independent contractors" and
subsidiary corporations is consistent with Federal Trade Commission precedent where strict
adherence to common law requirements has not been required in holding parent corporations liable for the deceptive acts of their door-to-door sales outlets. See P. F. Collier &
Son v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1970).
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Although the direct sales industry has long been subject to a

variety of "Green River" ordinances"0 8 and "hawker and peddler"

statutes,20 many of these regulations were easily evaded" 8 and thus

were largely ineffective in curtailing actual fraud or sales misrepresentations. In recent years states have enacted "cooling off" period
legislation designed to provide the consumer a reasonable period

of time to reflect upon the wisdom of his purchase in door-to-door
sales transactions. 2

However, despite the possible salutory impact

of cooling off period legislation in alleviating the effects of high
pressure salesmanship, such laws are obviously no panacea for
eliminating unfair and deceptive practices which do not become
apparent to the buyer until after the expiration of his cancellation
210
period.

Unlike the earlier regulations and the more recent cooling off
period legislation, the home solicitation selling code is principally
directed at the underlying unfair and deceptive practices used by
direct sellers. As a result, the code takes on a number of time-worn
door-to-door sales gimmicks and misrepresentations. For example,
211
misrepresentations that the buyer has been specially selected,
that the seller is conducting a survey, test or research project1 2 or
that the seller is conducting a special sales promotion campaign or

making a special offer to a few persons only or for a limited period
206. So-named after an ordinance in Montana which declared unsolicited door-to-door
selling to be a public nuisance and which has been widely adopted elsewhere.
207. See, for example, WIs. STAT. §§ 440.81, et seq. (1971).
208. For example, laws regulating or prohibiting unsolicited door-to-door selling were
evaded by the use of telephone "come-ons" which would permit the salesman to technically
gain entry into the home through the invitation of the prospective customer.
209. For a general discussion of high pressure selling tactics in the direct sales industry
and a review of cooling off period legislation, see Sher, The "Cooling Off' Periodin Doorto-Door Sales, 15 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1969). In Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. §§ 423.201, et seq.
(1971), provides a three day "cooling off" period or right to cancel in any consumer
transaction other than a catalog sale unaccompanied by any other solicitation or
. . .other than a sale or lease or listing for sale of real property, a sale of goods at
auction, the sale or lease of goods for an agricultural purpose or a loan made to
finance the sale of goods at auction for an agricultural purpose 1) which is initiated
by face-to-face solicitation away from a regular place of business of the merchant
or by mail or telephone solicitation directed to the particular customer and 2) which
is consummated or in which the customer's offer to contract or other writing evidencing the transaction is received by the merchant away from a regular place of business
of the merchant and involves the extension of credit or is a cash transaction in which
the amount the customer pays exceeds $25. Wis. STAT. § 423.201 (1971).
210. See Generally Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The
Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling Off Period, 78 YALE L. J. 618 (1969).
211. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 127.03(l)(a) (1974).
212. Wis. ADM. CODE, § Ag 127.03(1)(b) (1974).
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of time213 are prohibited. The code further prohibits representations that the seller will give any product or service free or as a
gift if the furnishing of such product or service is contingent on the
making of any payment or the purchase of any other product or
service. 24 The code also prohibits misrepresenting the identity of
the seller, 2 5 the length of the sales presentation, 21 the delivery or
performance date, 2 7 or the nature of any document the customer
218
is requested to execute.
In addition to the prohibitions against specific misrepresentations, a general catch-all provision prohibits any false, misleading or deceptive representations to induce a sale or any ".

.

. plan,

scheme or ruse which misrepresents the true status or mission of
the person making the call .... ,,219 The code also requires all
material warranty representations to be furnished to the buyer in
writing220 and prohibts any statements or representations inconsistent with or contradictory to any document evidencing the transac21
tion.
A further safeguard against surreptitious entry into a a prospective customer's home by a door-to-door salesman is the socalled "door opener" provision of the code. 222 Under this provision,
the seller is required to initially disclose "the seller's individual
name, the name of the business firm or organization he represents,
and the identity or kind of goods or services he offers to sell...
before asking any questions or making any statements other than
an initial greeting. ' ' 22 This one positive disclosure provision was
added rather than attempting to specifically catalog each and every
deceptive "foot in the door" tactic used by ingenious door-to-door
salesmen over the years.
Although the home solicitation selling industry is specifically
singled out by the code, the courts have given great leeway to the
states in making reasonable classifications in areas of economic
and fiscal regulation.2 4 In light of the unfair practices which have
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Wis.
Wis.
Wis.
Wis.
Wis.
Wis.
Wis.
Wis.
Wis.
Wxis.

ADM.
ADMI.
ADM.
ADM.
ADM.
ADM.
ADM.
ADM.
ADM.
ADM.

CODE,
CODE,
CODE,
CODE,
CODE,
CODE,
CODE,
CODE,
CODE,
CODE,

§ Ag
§ Ag
§ Ag
§ Ag
§ Ag
§ Ag
§ Ag
§ Ag
§ Ag
§ Ag

127.03(1)(c) (1974).
127.03(1)(d) (1974).
127.03(2)(a) (1974).
127.03(2)(c) (1974).
127.03(2)(d) (1974).
127.03(2)(e) (1974).
127.03(3) (1974).
127.03(4) (1974).
127.03(5) (1974).
127.02(1) (1974).

Id.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71
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manifested themselves in home solicitation selling, there appears
to be sound justification for treating that industry as a special class
deserving of separate regulation."2 5 As said in State of Arizona v.
Direct Sellers Association of Arizona:
It is abundantly clear that the door-to-door segment of the retailing industry is a proper subject for separate classification and
regulation. It should also be noted that house-to-house selling
has in several instances been completely prohibited by city ordinances, and the classification has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622, 95 L. Ed. 1233, 71 S. Ct. 21. If a separate classification is
valid for the purpose of prohibiting door-to-door sales, afortiori
it is valid for the purpose of merely regulating them."'
IV.

CONSUMER LAW ENFORCEMENT

A. Department of Justice ProgramActivities
Following the enactment of the remedial consumer fraud legislation in 1970,227 the Wisconsin Department of Justice, through its
Office of Consumer Protection, developed one of the more vigorous state programs directed against deceptive trade practices.12 1 By
the end of 1973, the Department had commenced eighty-seven
formal legal actions2 9 against a wide range of illegal business activities, including chain distributorship schemes, phony home repairs,
usurious credit plans, deceptive door-to-door sales operations, and
(1968); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See Generally Note,
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087 (1969). For
Wisconsin cases in support, see Simanco, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 57 Wis. 2d 47,
203 N.W.2d 648 (1973); State Bank of Drummond v. Nuesse, 13 Wis. 2d 74, 108 N.W.2d
283 (1961); Price v. State, 168 Wis. 603, 171 N.W. 77 (1919).
225. In Wisconsin direct selling has generated more complaints than its share of the
retail market would justify. For example, in 1971, 21% of the complaints received by the
Wisconsin Departments of Agriculture and Justice were solicited in the home, although
direct sales accounted for only I to 3% of all retailing. See Meserve, The ProposedFederal
Door-to-DoorSales Act: An Examination of its Effectiveness as a ConsumerRemedy and
the Constitutional Validity of its Enforcement Provision, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1171,
1173 (1969). And see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., supra note 224; Borden Co. v.
McDowell, 8 Wis. 2d 246, 99 N.W.2d 146 (1959); and Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955), for cases on the subject of the validity of separate
classification and treatment of particular industries.
226. 108 Ariz. 165, 168, 494 P.2d 361, 364 (1972).
227. Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 425.
228. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 760
(1972).
229. 1970-1973 ANNUAL REPORTS, OFFICE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, WISCONSIN
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
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fraudulent or unconscionable automobile selling tactics.20 During
this same period the Department obtained 109 separate orders or

judgments enjoining hundreds of merchants and firms from engaging in illegal activities and received 348 voluntary assurances
23
of discontinuance of illegal conduct from a variety of businesses. '
The Department also obtained twenty civil forfeiture judgments
totalling $1,477,443 and recovered more than one million dollars
in restitution for Wisconsin residents through court
judgments and
22
resolution of complaints short of court action.
In addition to maintaining an active mediation and complaint
processing program involving the handling of more than 10,000
complaints each year,2 3 the Justice Department's consumer pro-

tection program has functioned as a statewide clearing house for
consumer complaints from other state and local agencies. These
complaints are fed into a computer data bank where they are used
as an enforcement tool in detecting statewide and local trends and
practices relating to consumer fraud.234 A monthly report is also
disseminated to state and local enforcement officials and private
organizations which summarizes consumer litigation developments
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. Department of Justice consumer complaints have steadily grown from 587 in
1969 to 3200 in 1970, 5780 in 1971, 9,977 in 1972, and 13,090 in 1973. In addition to handling
complaints, the Department played a major role in assisting consumers in receiving refunds
of excess interest paid as a result of the ruling in State v. J. C. Penney, 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179
N.W.2d 641 (1970), and the subsequent enactment of an interest refund law (Wis. Laws
1971, ch. 308). More than 100,000 refund request forms prepared by the Department of
Justice were distributed to Wisconson residents.
234. The Justice Department's computer data bank program was established in 1970
to help in processing and analysing the growning number of consumer complaints received
by the Department and other state and local complaint receiving agencies in Wisconsin. By
early 1974, the Departments of Agriculture and Regulation and Licensing, the State Motor
Vehicle Division, the Office of the Commissioner of Securities and several local agencies
actively participated in the computer program. Each complaint received by these agencies
is recorded on computer tape by name of respondent, complainant, transaction date, place
of initial contact, place of transaction, nature of practice, industry involved and disposition.
Microfiche reports of the information on each complaint are generated weekly. Monthly
reports are generated which provide a statistical analysis of the complaints and an alphabetical listing of respondents against whom five or more complaints have been received. County
listings are also sent to district attorneys on a quarterly basis for use in their own locality.
In addition, specific industry-wide or trade practice printouts can be obtained for use at
legislative or rule-making hearings.
A special forty-eight page summary of the Wisconsin Department of Justice computer
data bank program appeared in STATE CONSUMER ACTION SUMMARY '72, FEDERAL OFFICE
FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS

(1972).
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in Wisconsin. Through these and other activities,2 5 a coordinated
statewide program with the seventy-one district attorneys who

share concurrent consumer protection enforcement jurisdiction 3 '
has been implemented.
In 1972 the Justice Department opened two neighborhood con-

sumer offices in Milwaukee's inner city as a result of a grant from
the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity.2 3 The OEO funds
were made available because of the pressing need for local con-

sumer complaint centers in the low income communities of Milwaukee and the fact that the poor-are reluctant to complain to
distant state agencies even when they have been victimized by

fraudulent business practices.231 By establishing the Milwaukee

consumer offices, the Department was able to initiate a concerted

effort against certain inner city consumer abuses which had not
2 39
previously been brought to the attention of state officials.
The enforcement activities of the Justice Department have had

a direct effect on the increased emphasis on rulemaking by the
Department of Agriculture. Not only has the Justice Department's
enforcement program eased the Agriculture Department's own

enforcement responsibilities but many of the enforcement proceedings brought by the Justice Department have crystallized problem
areas that proved to be susceptible to general rule-making. The
home solicitation selling code, for example, was largely based upon

the experience and special orders resulting from several complaints
filed by the Department of Justice 40 against major door-to-door
241
book or magazine sales operations.
235. Other innovations include preparation of a Prosecutor's Manual on Consumer
Fraud and Unfair Business Practices (1971) and dissemination of a three-part complaint
questionnaire for use by district attorneys and other complaint handling agencies.
236. WIs. STAT. §§ 100.18( l)(d) and 100.26(6) (1971).
237. OEO Grant No. CG5654.
238. See EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 24 and 36 (1970).
239. In State v. George de Gonzalez, d/b/a National Institute of Languages, Inc., et
al., No. 415-040 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, Nov. 19, 1973), for example, the State
obtained an injunction and $1000 civil forfeiture against an English language training school
for soliciting Spanish speaking Milwaukee residents to enter into a contract which violated
numerous provisions of the Wisconsin Consumer Act and the home solicitation selling code.
Except for the existence of bilingual staff members in the Justice Department's Southside
Milwaukee Office of Consumer Protection, it is highly doubtful whether the information
leading to the action and subsequent injunction could have been obtained. And see, Note,
Consumer Protection By The State Attorneys General: A Time For Renewal, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 423 (1973).
240. WIS. STAT. § 100.20(4) (1971).
241. In the Matter of Grolier Interstate, Inc., et al., No. 947 (Wis. Dept. of Ag, Feb.
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B. Prevention of Deceptive Selling Representationsunder Section
100.18

It is the general prohibition against untrue, misleading or deceptive selling representations 242 which provides the breadth and
significance to section 100.18. Although there is little difficulty in
defining the term "untrue" 243 under the statute, the definition of
the terms "deceptive" and "misleading"2 4 have proved more difficult to ascribe an exact meaning. However, the courts, through

recognizing the difficulty in defining such terms, have consistently
upheld the validity of statutes such as section 100.18,245 as well as
other similar triade regulation laws.24 Moreover, the application of
Federal Trade Commission standards concerning the meaning of
the term "deceptive" under section 5 of the FTC Act has provided
guidance to the courts in applying the statute.
Under Federal Trade Commission law deceptive statements
are measured by the probable subjective effect the statement or
representation has on the listener or reader.247 Thus, it is not neces6, 1971); In the Matter of Terry Carrick, d/b/a Family Publications Service, No. 968 (vis.
Dept. of Ag, Oct. 25, 1971); In the Matter of Cowles Communications, Inc., et al., No.
798 (Wis. Dept. of Ag, Oct. 29, 1971).
242. In subsection (1) of Wis. STAT. § 100.18 (1971).
243. BOUVIER's LAw DICTIONARY (1914) defin6s untrue as: "Prima facie inaccurate,
but not willfully false." In Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, 108 F.2d 902, 905 (10th Cir. 1940), the court simply stated: "A statement is 'untrue'
which does not express things exactly as they are."
244. The terms "deceptive" and "misleading" are virtually synonymous and are often
defined in terms of each other. See People v. Wahl, 39 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 771, 100 P.2d
550 (1940).
245. In Carpets By The Carload, Inc., v. Warren, et al., 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis.,
1973), the federal district court upheld the constitutionality of § 100.18(1) against a claim
that it was facially void for vagueness. See generally State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscott
Interplanetary, Inc., et al., 212 Kan. 668, 512 P.2d 416 (1973); Washington v. Readers
Digest Ass'n., Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972), app. dism. 411 U.S. 945 (1973);
People v. Gym of America, Inc., 493 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1972); FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros.,
Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
In discussing common law fraud and deceit, it is stated at 37 ANI. JUR. 2d, Fraud& Deceit,
§ 1, at 18 as follows:
the fertility of man's invention in devising new schemes of of fraud is so great that
courts have always declined to define it, reserving to themselves the liberty to deal
with it in whatever form it may present itself. It is indeed, said that it is better not
to define the term lest the craft of men should find ways of committing fraud which
might evade such a definition.
246. See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); United States v. An Article of Drug,
394 U.S. 784 (1969); Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
247. Under FTC law the standard is "tendency or capacity to deceive," which measures
whether the natural or probable result of a given representation will be to deceive the
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sary to establish that anyone has actually been misled or injured
by the statement in question so long as there exists a likelihood that
a substantial segment of the public could be misled. 48 Moreover,
even though each statement or representation taken individually is
true, there exists a violation if the sales representations taken as a
whole possess the capacity to deceive. 49
In determining whether there exists a capacity to deceive, the
law looks not to the most sophisticated readers or listeners, but to
the most credulous and gullible.25 As one court observed:
The law is not for the protection of the experts but for the public
-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to
analyze, but who are governed by appearances and general impressions.21
In addition, lack of knowledge as to the falsity of the representations or a specific lack of intent to deceive2 2 is not a defense to a
charge of deceptive selling representations.
Since the temporary and permanent injunctive relief is specifically authorized,2 53 the usual equitable grounds of irreparable
harm or inadequate remedy at law need not be shown in actions
under section 100.18.254 In addition, the fact that the defendant
consuming public. Carter Products v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963); United States
Retail Credit Associaton of FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 1962); Kbch v. FTC, 206 F.2d
311, 3i7 (6th Cir. 1953).
248. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963) Basic Books, Inc. v.
FTC, 276 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1960); Ericson Hair and Scalp Specialists y. FTC, 272 F.2d
318 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. den. 362 U.S. 940 (1960); Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.
1944). To the same effect, see Kugler v. Koscott Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216,
293 A.2d 682 (1972).
249. Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962); Kalwojtys v. FTC,
237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956); Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 188 (1947)
Brockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943).
250. Charles of the Ritz Distributor Corp. v. FTC, 143 F12d 676 (2nd Cir., 1944);
Aronberg, t.g. Positive Products Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 16) (7th Cir. 1942).
251. P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
252. Montgomery Ward v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967); Feil v. FTC, 285
F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960); Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); D.D.D.
Corporation v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942). To the same effect, see State ex rel.
Danforth v. Independence Dodge, 494 S.W.2d 362 (Xo. 1973), and In re Brandywine
Volkswagon, Ltd., 306 A.2d 24 (Del. Super. 1973).
253. Pursuant to subsection (11)(d) of Wis. STAT. § 100.18 (1971).
254. See Hendersen v. Burd, 133 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1943); Walling v. Builders Veneer
& Woodwork Co., 45 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1942); Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937); 42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunction, § 38. This doctrine has been
applied in several lower court decisions in Wisconsin state courts. State v. Holiday Magic,
et al., No. 388-759 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, Oct. 12, 1971); State v. Koscott Interplanetary, Inc., et al., No. 394-480 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, Nov. 24, 1971).
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may have voluntarily discontinued to engage in the alleged illegal
practices prior to trial does not prevent the court from issuing an
injunction because of the ease with which the defendant could
resume the practices in the future.25 Similarly, since the purpose
of an injunction is not to punish for past offenses but to prevent
illegal practices in the future, 256 the injunction may be broader than
the specific offense charged to cover related unlawful acts. 251 As
said in Northern Wis. Co-operative Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal:
a court cannot look into the future and define all of the practices
which might be restored to, .... and an order which attempted
to detail the various acts and practice prohibited would necessarily be construed as permitting all not specifically prohibited, and
deny to the respondent full and complete remedy to which it is
entitled to. We think the order must necessarily be in general
terms.21

A common issue in enforcement proceedings under section
100.18 is whether a supplier or distributor should be enjoined for
the illegal activities of the salesmen or "independent contractors"
who were actually engaged in making the selling representations.
Generally where the distributor equips the salesmen with customary sales aids, such as promotional literature and retail installment
contracts, it is deemed responsible for the acts and practices employed by the salesmen to induce sales.259 Indeed, once an agency
relationship is established,"' the supplier or distributor is responsible for his agents' activities even though he may have taken some
steps to dismiss or discipline them for using misleading or deceptive tactics."'
255. Merch & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 927 (6zh Cir. 1968); Giant Food, Inc. v.
FTC, 322 F.2d 977, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. den. 376 U.S. 967 (1964); Automobile
Owners Safety Insurance Co. v. FTC, 255 F.2d 295, 297-98 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. den. 358
U.S. 875 (1958). For Wisconsin cases see Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No.
5, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N.W. 270 (1936) Clancy v. Gelb, 126 Wis. 286, 70 N.W. 746 (1905);
Mc Farland v. Lindekugel, 107 Wis. 474, 83 N.W. 757 (1900). And see State v. Ralph
Williams Northwest Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d 233 (1973).
256. Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1944); Northern Wis. Cooperative Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N.W. 936 (1924).
257. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394 (1965); FTC v. Rubberoid Co.,
343 U.S. 470, 473 (1951).
258. 182 Wis. 571, 598, 197 N.W. 936, 946 (1924).
259. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); Standard Distributors v. FTC,
211 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1954); Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
den. 344 U.S. 912 (1953); International Art Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1940).
260. See Dettman v. Nelson Tester Co., 7 Wis. 2d 6, 95 N.W.2d 804 (1959); Meyers v.
Matthews, 270 Wis. 453, 71 N.W.2d 368 (1955).
261. See FTC v. Standard Education Society, 148 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1945); Perma-Maid
Co., Inc. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6zh Cir. 1941).
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A similar problem relates to covering individual corporate officers in injunctive orders. The courts have generally upheld inclusion of the corporate officers of a corporation, whether a sham or
not, who formulated, directed and controlled the corporate policies
and practices of the company 6 2 even though
they have since left
23
the employ of the corporate respondent. 1
The manifest state interest in protecting its residents from
fraudulent business practices has led some state courts to assert
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants with little or no physical
presence in the forum state. 264 As the court said in State v. Readers
Digest Ass'n., Inc. 215 which involved an action by the State of
Washington to enjoin violations of its Consumer Protection Act
committed soley through the mail:
Respondent solicited Washington business and derived substantial profits from Washington residents by clearly illegal methods.
It is the duty of the state to protect its residents from such unfair
practices. If our courts are not open, the state will be without a
remedy in any court and the Consumer Protection Act will be
rendered useless.
Although the remedy of injunctive relief is hardly novel and has
been supplemented with stronger and more innovative consumer
remedies, it remains the most significant public remedy against
consumer fraud because of its flexibility"6 7 and relative simplicity
262. Standard Distributors, Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7, 15 (2d Cir. 1954); FTC v. Standard
Education Society, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
The Wisconsin Consumer Act has gone beyond this doctrine by, in effect, making the
corporate officers and other managing directors the guarantors for the recovery of damages
or penalties under the Act which cannot be collected from the corporation because of
insolvency or dissolution if they "knew of, should have known of or wilfully participated
in" a violation and "if a meaningful part of the corporation's activities were in violation of
the act." Wis. STAT. § 425.310 (1971).
263. Benrus Watch Co., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1965).
264. Doug Sanders Golf Intercontinental of Southeastern Wisconsin Inc. v. American
Manhatten Industries, Inc., et al., 359 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Wis. 1973); People by Lefkowitz
v. Colorado State Christian College of Church of Junes Power, Inc., 346 N.Y.S.2d 482
(1973): State v. Readers Digest Ass'n., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972), app. dism.
411 U:S. 945 (1973); Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141
N.W.2d 287 (1965), app. dism. 385 U.S. 205 (1966), reh. den. 385 U.S. 1033 (1967); Paulos
v. Best Securities, 260 Minn. 283, 109 N.W. 2d 576 (1961).
265. 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972), app. dism. 411 U.S. 945 (1973).
266. State v. Readers Digest Ass'n., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 278, 501 P.2d 290, 303 (1972).
267. In State v. Johnson, d/b/a Park Furniture, et al, No. 396-117 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee
County, March 27, 1973), the court not only enjoined the defendants from engaging in the
future use of bait and switch tactics, misleading advertising and deceptive guarantees in
violation of WIs. STAT. § 100.18(1) and (9)(a), but it also enjoined the defendants from
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in directly halting deceptive practices.
C. RestitutionaryRelief For Unfair Or Deceptive Sales Schemes

An ancillary remedy to the injunctive relief available under
sections 100.18 and 100.20 is the restoration of pecuniary losses to
injured persons. 68 The inclusion of this remedy together with the
public remedy of injunctive relief reflects a legislative concern for
the considerable financial harm that can result from unfair or
deceptive selling schemes as well as an awareness that traditional

public and private remedies are often of little value in deterring
consumer fraud. The restitution remedy is designed both to assure
that the merchant is deprived of the illegal fruits of his past deceptive practices and to deter illegal conduct in the future by eliminating the merchant's expectation that he can profit from such activi69
ties.2
Approximately twenty-one other states270 have provided similar
authority to the Attorney General or other designated official to
seek restitution in conjunction with a state action to restrain the
enforcing or making collection efforts with respect to any contract induced by reason of
the illegal activity. This latter ruling was most significant since Park Furniture had approximately 13,000 past customers involving an estimated S1.5 million in purchases.
268. Wis. STAT. § 100.18(11)(d) (1971), reads as follows:
(d) The department or the department of justice or any district attorney, upon
informing the department of justice, may commence an action in circuit court in the
name of the state to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction any violation of
this section. The court may in its discretion, prior to entry of final judgment, make
such orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person any pecuniary
loss suffered because of the acts or practices involved in the action, provided proof
thereof is submitted to the satisfaction of the court. The department of justice may
subpoena persons, require the production of books and other documents, and may
request the department to exercise its authority under par. (c) to aid in the investigation of alleged violations of this section.
Wis. STAT. § 100.20(6) (1971), provides:
(6) The department may commence an action in circuit court in the name of the
state to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the violation of any order
issued under this section. The court may in its discretion, prior to entry of final
judgment make such orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to any
person any pecuniary loss suffered because of the uses or practices involved in the
action, provided proof thereof is submitted to the satisfaction of the court. The
department may use its authority in ss. 93.14 and 93.15 to investigate violations of
any order issued under this section.
269. See generally Comment, FraudulentAdvertising: The Right of a Public Attorney
to Seek Restitution For Consumers, 4 PACIFXc L. J. 168 (1973); Wade & Kemenshine,
Restitution for Defrauded Consumers: Making the Remedy Effective Through Suit by
Government Agency, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1031 (1969).
270. See Lovett, State Deceptive Trade PracticeLegislation,46 TUL. L. REv. 724, 741
(1972).
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violation of an unfair or deceptive trade practice law. All of these
statutes are of recent vintage so there is not yet an extensive body
of case law on the subject. However, the concept is grounded on
the traditional equitable principal that once equity jurisdiction at-

taches the court may grant full and complete relief, including restitution to injured parties.271 The concept is also embodied in several
federal court decisions which implied restitution authority in instances where an administrative agency only possessed explicit

power to seek injunctions for violations of federal law. 2 The
rationale of these federal decisions appears equally applicable to a
state agency proceeding under an unfair or deceptive trade practice
23
statute which is silent as to whether restitution can be ordered. 1

The leading decision dealing with an explicit grant of restitution authority tied to a state consumer fraud injunctive statute is
Kugler v. Romain.2 4 Kugler involved a proceeding for injunctive
relief brought by the Attorney General pursuant to the New Jersey
271. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torburg, 274 Wis. 478, 80 N.W.2d 461 (1957); Mitchell
Realty Co. v. West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W. 390 (1924).
272. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union of Florida, 272 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Fla. 1967); SEC v. Wong, 252 F.
Supp. 608 (D.P.R. 1966); Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960);
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
The Federal Trade Commission has concluded that it possesses the implicit authority
to order restitution to vindicate the public injury resulting from unfair or deceptive business
practices and to deter such conduct in the future. See In the Matter of Universal Credit
Acceptance Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. RPTR., 1 20,240 (1973); In the Matter of Curtis
Publishing Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. RPTR., 91 19,719 (1971). However, the Commission's
view of its restitution authority has yet to be upheld by the courts.
273. A recent far reaching case handed down by the California Supreme Court in
People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, respondent, and the Jayhill Corporation, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 192, 507 P.2d 1400 (1973), held that even in the absence of a specific statutory
provision the Attorney General had the inherent power to secure restitution on behalf of
defrauded consumers. The court stated as follows:
At the time the complaint was filed Business and Professions Code section 17535
provided that false or misleading advertising 'may be enjoined' in an action by the
Attorney General, but was silent as to the power of the trial court to order restitution
in such a proceeding. On the other hand the statute did not restrict the court's general
equity jurisdiction 'in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference.'
(Porter v. Warner Co. (1946), 328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S. Ct. 1086, 1089, 90 L. Ed.
1332.) In the absence of such a restriction a court of equity may exercise the full
range of its inherent powers in order to accomplish complete justice between the
parties, restoring if necessary the status quo ante as nearly as may be achieved. ...
In particular, in an action by the Attorney General under section 17535 a trial court
has the inherent power to order, as a form of ancillary relief, that the defendants
make or offer to make restitution to the customers found to have been defrauded
.... (507 P.2d at 1402.)
274. 110 N.J. Super. 470, 266 A.2d 144 (Essex Cty. Ct., 1970), modified, 58 N.J. 522,
279 A.2d 640 (1971).
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Consumer Fraud Act 27 5 against a door-to-door seller of certain socalled educational books. The trial court enjoined the defendant
from various deceptive practices, but limited restitution to the
twenty-four consumers who testified at the trial. The Supreme
Court held that the restitution order should have extended to all
customers of the defendant. The court largely based its decision on
the ". . .tremendous need to find a simple, inexpensive solution
which will accomplish the greatest possible good for the greatest
number of consumers who have common problems and complaints
vis-a-vis the seller .. ."217 The court concluded that the legislature must have had this in mind when it created the public restitution remedy:
it seems plain that the lawmakers accepted the premise that the
market bargaining process does not protect ordinary consumers
from serious damage in a large number of transactions. Obviously, giving the consumer rights and remedies which he must
assert individually in the courts would provide little therapy for
the overall public aspect of the problem. It has been said that
"[o]ne cannot think of a more expensive and frustrating course
than to seek to regulate goods or 'contract' quality through repeated lawsuits against inventive 'wrongdoer.'.... .(M)ass
consumer transactions growing out of unequal bargaining power
and unfair practices should not be handled on a case-by-case
basis. The emphasis must be upon public rather than private
remedies, and the natural remedial step is government interven27
tion.
The court also recognized the deterrent value of providing
broader restitution relief:
Denial of such relief would be unfortunate not only in this case,
but it would operate as a serious impairment to the deterrent
effect of the sanctions which we believe underlies the Consumer
Fraud Act.28
Although Kugler v. Romain has been widely praised 279 and has
subsequently been reaffirmed, 20 there is some doubt as to its appli275. Sections 56.8-2 and 56.8-8, New Jersey Statutes (1971).
276. Supra note 274, 279 A.2d at 649.
277. Id. at 536-537, 279 A.2d at 648.
278. Id. at 534, 279 A.2d at 647.
279. See Note, Contracts - Consumer FraudAct - State Attorney GeneralAuthorized
to Initiate Class Actions in Instancesof Price Unconscionability,40 FORDHAM L. REV.671
(1970); Note, Consumer Protection - State Attorney General's Class Action; Exorbitant
Price to Unconscionability to Fraud,3 SETON HALL L. REV. 470 (1972).
280. Kugler v. Koscott Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 236, 293 A.2d 682,
693 (1972).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

cation to many consumer fraud transactions. The finding of price

unconscionability'l in Kugler enabled the trial court to devise a
simple restitution formula, namely the difference between the price

charged and the fair market value of the books sold, which could
then be readily applied to each customer's transaction. Normally,

however, such a simple formula is not available."' In addition,
there may often be a problem in establishing the customer's reli-

ance upon the unfair or deceptive practice involved. 83 This question was not present in Kugler v. Romain since the overpricing of
the product was an objective standard applicable to all customers.

A more difficult situation is presented in the case of the oral sales

presentation which contains numerous inducements, many of
which are perfectly legal. Does the state have to bring in each
customer to individually testify as to the particular aspects of the
sales presentation which induced him to enter into the contract? 84
To establish such a reliance factor could be extremely time-

consuming and difficult since it would largely rest upon the
subjective mental impressions of the customer. At least one court285
resolved this problem by drawing an inference that the customer
did rely on the illegal representations, thereby placing the burden
upon the seller to come forward with evidence to the contrary. This
solution, though helpful to the customer in establishing a prima
facie case for restoration of pecuniary losses, hardly eases the
problem of keeping the litigation within manageable bounds.
281. In keeping with the progressive approach of the New Jersey courts in applying
the concept of unconscionability to consumer transactions. See General Investment Corp.
v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405
(1967); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). These
decisions may now be good authority in Wisconsin as a result of the enactment of Wis.
STAT. § 425.107(3)(i) (1971).
282. For example, in a case of bait and switch advertising the measure of restitution is
at best confusing. It may be the difference between the price of the bait item and the
represented value or price of the model to which the customer was switched. Or one could
argue that no restitution should be ordered absent proof that the item the customer was
switched to was overpriced in comparison to products of like grade or quality in the seller's
trade area. The latter result would, however, clearly undermine the deterrent purposes of
the law. Perhaps the easiest solution would be to order total restoration of the price paid.
This, of course, results in a windfall to the customer who has had the use of the item without
charge.
283. Both WIS. STAT. §§ 100.18( l1)(d) and 100.20(6) (1971), require a causal connection between the practices found illegal in the injunction portion of the litigation and the
pecuniary losses suffered by the customer.
284. Both Wis. STAT. §§ 100.18(I1)(d) and 100.20(6) (1971), require the submission of
"proof satisfactory to the court... ," but what this means in a given case is uncertain.
What does seem clear is that the legislature attempted to provide the courts the greatest
possible leeway in handling matters such as sufficiency of proof.
285. Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964 (1971).
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In light of the foregoing, it is obvious that both the enforcement
official and the court must carefully weigh the value of a restitution
order on a case by case basis. Because the remedy is not a true class
action designed simply to compensate a large class of claimants for
damages sustained, the court is not required to make restitution
available to each prospective claimant. Rather the court must consider the private compensatory concerns only after the public con-

siderations of deterrence and vindication of public injuries have
been weighed and resolved. At such time the court may determine

that total class relief may not further the public aims of the statute
or that such relief may be unwarranted or unnecessarily burdensome, and the restitution order may be restricted accordingly to

certain claimants falling within a narrow category.
D. Civil Forfeiture Relief For Unfair And Deceptive Sales

Schemes
The authority2s8 of the district attorneys and the Department

of Justice to seek civil forfeitures up to $10,000 per violation is an
important enforcement tool in compelling compliance with injunctions issued under section 100.18 and special or general orders
issued under section 100.20.

The civil forfeiture authority was enacted to provide a stiff
monetary penalty for noncompliance with specific injunctions or
orders288 without the attendant criminal burdens of pleading 29l and
286. Wis. STAT. § 100.26(6) (1971), reads as follows:
The department of justice or any district attorney may commence an action in
the name of the state to recover a civil forfeiture to the state of not less than $100
nor more than $10,000 for the violation of an injunction issued under s. 100.18 or an
order issued under s. 100.20.
287. In Lovett, supra note 270, at 739, the author expresses the view that the availability
of civil forfeiture or penalty authority would not only make most responsible business firms
reluctant to violate the law, but it would provide a needed remedy ". . . to deter and
suppress misconduct by a hard core of ruthless, low-grade entrepreneurs who refuse otherwise to conform with reasonable standards of fairness."
288. In a few states, notably California, Hawaii, New York and Washington, civil
penalties or forfeitures are provided for initial violations of a general unfair or deceptive
trade practice statute. Such penalties or forfeitures have been upheld as not being unconstitutionally void for vagueness. State v. Ralph Williams North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,
82 Wash. 2d 265, 510 P.2d 233 (1973); People v. Witzesman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 284 (Ct. App. 1972); State v. Readers Digest Ass'n., Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d
290 (1972), app. dism. 411 U.S. 945 (1973).
The Wisconsin Consumer Act also provides for civil penalties for initial violations of
any portion of the Act. Wis. Stat. § 426.301 (1971).
289. In People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192, 507 P.2d
1400 (1973), the court held that the state could plead generally and was not required to
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proof.290 Similar civil forfeiture or penalty authority exists under
the consumer fraud laws of more than 10 states29 1 and for violations
of cease and desist orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission.2 12 The availability of the civil forfeiture remedy is particularly
helpful in enforcement proceedings against firms which have devised subtle variations on a forbidden selling scheme. As said in
Federal Trade Commission v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., in discussing the propriety of a civil penalty in such cases:
If [defendants] in their . . . commercials attempt to to come
close to the line of misrepresentation as the commission's order
permits, they may without specifically intending to do so cross
into the area proscribed by this order. However, it does not seem
"unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close
to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may
cross the line." Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342
U.S. 337, 340 [1952].293
In determining the amount of civil forfeitures in a given case
the courts will, of course, primarily focus upon the number and
duration of violations.2 4 The courts will also consider the number
29
of people reached2 95 and the financial resources of the defendants.
separately identify each transaction by date, place, name of customer and name of salesman. See also Wis. STAT. § 288.02 (1971); First Credit Corporation v. Myrichs, 41 Wis. 2d
146, 163 N.W.2d 1 (1968); State v. Zillman, 121 Wis. 472, 98 N.W. 543 (1904);'Murray v.
McGarigle, 69 Wis. 483, 34 N.W. 522 (1887).
290. It is well settled that a civil forfeiture action is not criminal or quasi-criminal, but
is strictly civil and remedial in nature. Kugler v. Romain, 110 N.J. Super. 470, 266 A.2d
144 (1970), affd as modified 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); U.S. v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 355 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1966); Olshausen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 273 F.2d
23 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. den. 363 U.S. 820 (1960); Madonna v. State, 312 P.2d 257 (Cal.
App. 1957); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). Thus, proof of scienter or bad faith
is unnecessary in such cases. See United States v. H. M. Prince Textiles, Inc., 262 F. Supp.
383, 388 (S.D. N.Y., 1966); United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 212 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. N.
Y., 1962); United States v. Karns, 1963 Trade Cases, 1 70,950 (S.D. N. Y. 1963); United
States v. Home Diathermy Co., 1960 Trade Cases, 1 69,601 (S.D.N. Y. 1959); Federal
Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Company, 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934).
291. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 24 (1973).
292. § 5(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970).
293. 380 U.S. 374, 393 (1965).
294. Under some statutes the forfeitures or penalties are assessed for each day of
violation. Under other statutes, such as Wis. STAT. § 100.26(6) (1971), the assessment is
based upon the number of violations.
295. In People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 289, the court held
that the civil penalties should be assessed according to the number of customers who were
subjected to certain misrepresentations.
296. U.S. v. Wilson Chemical Co., Inc., 1962 Trade Cases, 1 70,478 (D.C. Pa. 1962);
U.S. v. University Wool Batting Corp., 1961 Trade Cases,
70,168 (D.C. N. Y. 1961).
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The question of the intent or bad faith of the defendants, though
not a valid defense to an action to recover civil penalties, is also
an appropriate consideration in determining the amount of penalties or forfeitures to impose.291 The courts will also consider mitigating circumstances which might result in a reduced civil forfeiture. For example, the failure of officials to enforce a violation for
a period of time even though they were aware of violations or the
fact that the firm has practiced long and faithful observance of an
order which it has now violated are factors which have served to
mitigate the amount of penalties or forfeitures.29 s At the same time,
however, the enforcement authorities are not required to give the
that their conduct may be in violation
defendants advance notice
2 99
question.
in
of the order
Despite the potential of civil forfeitures of penalties in enforcing compliance with state consumer protection laws, this authority
has been infrequently asserted by many states. According to a 1972
survey 39 only two states, New York and Wisconsin, had recovered
in excess of $10,000 per year in civil forfeitures or penalties. However, this apparent reluctance to vigorously utilize the forfeiture or
penalty authority may be diminishing since in 1973 at least five
states reported recovering at least $20,000 in civil forfeitures or
penalties in the preceding year.30 ' In any event, regardless of the
nationwide trend, the dramatic increase in the number and scope
of injunctions and special and general orders issued under sections
100.18 and 100.20 in recent years leads to the conclusion that the
exercise of the civil forfeiture authority will become increasingly
necessary and important in Wisconsin.
CONCLUSION

To a great extent the numerous additions to Wisconsin's consumer protection laws in the past five years represent a response
to certain fundamental changes in the buyer-seller relationship
297. United States v. H. M. Prince Textiles, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 383, 388 (S.D. N. Y.
1966); United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 212 F. Supp. 397, 398 (S.D. N. Y. 1962).
69,587 (6th Cir. 1959);
298. American Greetings Corp. v. U.S., 1959 Trade Cases,
69,601 (D.C. N.Y. 1959).
U.S. v. Home Diathermy Co., Inc., 1960 Trade Cases,
F.2d (2d Cir. 1974).
299. U.S. v. J. B. Williams Co., Inc., 300. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 52 (1972).
301. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 24 (1973). The five

states are Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Texas and Wisconsin.
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which date back more than fifty years."0 Similarly, the present
demand for stronger laws relating to the quality and servicing of
consumer products301 can be traced back to the development of
modern mass marketing techniques following World War II. With
the current pressures of inflation and product shortages, new consumer problems are no doubt now emerging which could become
aggravated in the near future. Although these emerging consumer
problems will likely be intertwined with some of the most acute ills
of our society and economy, the ability of the legal system to
fashion rational and innovative responses will largely determine

whether or not these problems will be dealt with fairly and effectively in the years ahead.
302. An interesting discussion of some of the dramatic and profound changes that have
taken place in the marketplace appears in O'Connell, Consumer Protectionin the State of
Washington, 39 STATE Gov'T 230 (1966).
303. At the federal level the concern for product quality was most clearly manifested
by the enactment of the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (Pub. L. No. 92-573). For
a discussion of the background leading to the passage of this law, see Note, Congress on
the Consumer Bandwagon: The Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 22 CATH. U. L.
REV. 847 (1973). In Wisconsin the principal consumer protection law enacted by the 1973
legislature related to the regulation of the quality of mobile homes. See Wis. Laws 1973,
ch. 116. In addition to providing for design and construction standards, the new mobile
home law requires a one year written warranty for every mobile home sold or leased in
Wisconsin and prohibits the waiver, exclusion or limitation of any implied warranty.
The regulation of automobile repair abuses has also been a volatile topic in recent years.
Although auto repairs rank high in consumer complaints in most states, there xists relatively few laws regulating unfair auto repair practices. See generally Note, Regulation of
Automotive Repair Services, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1010 (1971). In Wisconsin the Division
of Motor Vehicles promulgated Wis. ADM. CODE, § MVD 24.06 (1973), to regulate the
repair and servicing of motor vehicles by dealers licensed pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 218.01
(1971). However, these administrative regulations were suspended for more than one year
by the Joint Legislative Committee for Review of Administrative Rules and it is uncertain
at this juncture what the final resolution of this problem area will be in Wisconsin.

